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I.

INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1960's there has been a wave of securities reform proposals in Canada and the United States.' The wave in Canada has reached a
significant new point with the coming into force in September, 1979 of
Ontario's The Securities Act, 19782 and with the publication in December,
1979 of the federal government's Proposals for a Securities Market Law for
Canada (Proposals), 3 the culmination of almost six years work. 4 The wave in
the United States has reached a significant new point with the membership of
the American Law Institute in May, 1978 approving with amendments the
Proposed Official Draft of the Federal Securities Code (ALI Code).5 This is
the product of over eight years' work dedicated6 to the comprehensive restatement, with some major revisions, of the present scheme of American federal securities regulation, composed principally of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7 The ALI Code
1 A convenient listing of the major ones in the two jurisdictions appears in Can.,
3 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, Background Papers (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply & Services, 1979) [hereinafter 3 Proposals] at xiii-xv. Because the
various background papers in that volume were finished at different times before 1979,
and not updated for publication in it, their dates of completion are given where they
are cited.
2 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, in force 15 September 1979, as am.
by S.O. 1979, c. 86, in force 1 January 1980.
3 Can., 1 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, Draft Act (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply & Services, 1979) [hereinafter I Proposals]; Can., 2 Proposals for a
Securities Market Law for Canada, Commentary (Ottawa: Minister of Supply & Services, 1979) [hereinafter 2 Proposals]; and 3 Proposals, supra note 1. 1 Proposals, s.
16.16, discussed in 2 Proposals at 396-97, directs that 2 Proposals and 3 Proposals,
together with any other report laid before Parliament in connection with the Proposals
and the proceedings of Parliament on the consideration of the Draft Act should be
considered in construing the latter. Hence, frequent reference will be made to the
appropriate parts of 2 Proposals and, where apparently germane, 3 Proposals in connection with individual Draft Act provisions.
4 A history of the project is in 1 Proposals, supra note 3, at vi-viii.
5 American Law Institute, Federal Securities Code, Proposed Official Draft Lewis
Loss, Reporter (Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1978) [hereinafter ALl
Code, POD], as am. by Supplement to Proposed Official Draft (Philadelphia: The
American Law Institute, 1978) [hereinafter ALl Code, Supp. to POD].
6 An account of the reasons for and history of the ALI Code project is in volume

1 of the two volume work which consolidates, with further minor amendments approved
or authorized in 1979, ALl Code, POD, id. and ALl Code, Supp. to POD, id.; this work
also includes all the Reporter's Comments, as amended from prior tentative drafts of
the Code: American Law Institute, 1 Federal Securities Code Lewis Loss, Reporter
(Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1980) [hereinafter 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code]
at xix-xxiv. The second volume is American Law Institute, 2 Federal Securities Code
(Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1980) [hereinafter 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code].
7 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976); and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-77jj (1976). A listing of the other statutory
components of that scheme and a compact account of its structure are to be found in
Securities and Exchange Commission, The Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission April 1974 [hereinafter SEC (1974)], published by the Commission and reprinted with some deletions in Jennings and Marsh, Securities Regulation Cases and
Materials (4th ed. Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1977) [hereinafter Jennings and
Marsh] at 29-45. All page references to the Commission publication are to the appropriate pages in the latter work.
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could go before the House of Representatives in the present session of the
Congress.8
An important topic in the reform process has been the requirement on
a new issue of securities to file a disclosure document with the relevant administrative agency for examination and eventual delivery to investors in the
new issue." This requirement, along with one for the licensing of securities
market professionals by that agency,' has long been a staple of securities
regulation in the two countries." Licensing is designed to ensure that such
persons are honest, competent and financially responsible.' 2 New issue disclosure through the mechanism of a prospectus"a provides the investor with
8 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, at xxiii-xxiv, which notes that the version
to be so considered could differ to some extent from the present version. And see
Schorr, Plan to Rewrite Federal Securities Law Appears Close to Being Endorsed by
SEC, Wall St. J., July 31, 1980 at 3, col. 3 (some revisions proposed by SEC, numbering about six major ones).
11The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, Parts XIV-XVI, read with ss. 1(1)42
("trade"), 40 ("security"), 14 ("distribution to the public"), II ("distribution") and
43 ("underwriter") as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86, ss. 4-10; 1 Proposals,supra note 3, Parts 5,
6 and 3 read with ss. 2.17 ("distribution"), 2.40 ("sale"), 2.45 ("security") and 2.49
("underwriter"); the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-8, 10, 3 and 4 read with §§ 2(1) ("security"), (3) ("sale" or "sell"), (10) ("prospectus") and (I I) ("underwriter"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77e-77h, 77j, 77c (and 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c (1979)) and 77d read with § 77b(l), (3),
(10) and (11) (1976); and I ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, Part V and §302 read with
the definitional cross reference in §501. The Ontario Act in its present form is largely the
result of proposals made in Ontario Securities Commission, Report of the Committee of
the Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by
Business Combinations and Private Placements (Toronto: Department of Financial &
Commercial Affairs, 1970) [hereinafter OSC Disclosure Report], cc. IlI-VI and VIII. The
Ontario Act in its turn was one of the major influences on the drafting of I Proposals,Part
5, the central part of the Prosopals'new issue regulatory scheme: 2 Proposals,supra note 3,
Part 5. A discussion of the major proposals for reform in the new issue disclosure area contained in the I ALl Fed. Sec. Code is in Painter, The Federal Securities Code and
Corporate Disclosure (Charlottesville: Mitchie, 1979) [hereinafter Painter], c. I (on
ALI Code, POD, supra note 5, as am. by ALl Code, Supp. to POD, supra note 6:
there have been only minor changes since he wrote). The new issue disclosure area has
not been the main focus of reformers' attentions in the two jurisdictions, however: see
note 15 and text accompanying that note, infra.
10 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, Parts X and XI read with ss. 1(1)42
('tade"), 40 ("security"), 43 ("underwriter") and I ("adviser"), as am. by S.O. 1979,
c. 86, s. 3; 1 Proposals, supra note 3, Part 8, read with ss. 2.07 ("broker"), 2.14
("dealer"), 2.02 ("adviser") and 2.49 ("underwriter"); the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 15 read with §§ 3(a)(4) ("broker"), (5) ("dealer") and (12) ("exempted
security"), 15 U.S.C. §78o (and 15 U.S.C.A. §77o (1979)) read with §78c(4), (5) and
(12) (1976); and 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, Part VII and §302(5) read with
the definitional cross references in §701.
11 For a history covering new issue disclosure regulation in Canada and the United
Stptes, see Grover and Baillie, "Disclosure Requirements" (1976), in 3 Proposals,supra
note I, at 368-78; for a brief history of licensing requirements in the two countries, see
Connelly, "The Licensing of Securities Market Actors" (1978), in 3 Proposals, op. cit.,
[hereinafter Connelly (1978)] at 1269-70.
12 Connelly (1978), id., at 1273-74.
13 "Prospectus" is here used in the sense of the required new issue disclosure document that is subject to the detailed contents requirements of the relevant regulatory
scheme and vetting by the relevant administrative agency before that document's delivery
to investors: see The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 55, 60 and 70(1) and
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investment information in lengthy narrative and financial form. In some detail, it outlines the method of offering, the security being offered, the issuer
and its business, its management and control and other matters. 14 Undoubtedly the main effect of the securities reform waves in Canada and the United
States has been to shift the disclosure regulation emphasis away from new
issue or primary market "special occasion" disclosure to "continuous disclosure" for traders in previously issued securities in the "secondary markets."'"
However, that has not meant that significant changes in the new issue disclosure scheme have not been forthcoming, striving to define better the circumstances in which new issue disclosure is required 6 and to integrate better the
new issue with the continuous disclosure 7 schemes.
The purposes of this article are to examine for Canada,' 8 in the light of
the legislation borne up by the securities reform waves, these shifts and
changes and, with the appearance of the Proposals,to comment on the handling of the two levels of disclosure regulation in Canada, federal and provincial. The article will draw, as seems appropriate, on the present and the proposed American federal legislation, which has exercised,', and seems likely to
S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 7 (adding new s. 62 to principal Act); 1 Proposals, supra note 3,
ss. 5.05, 5.09 and 5.15(1); the Securities Act of 1933, §§10(a), 7, 8 and 5(b), 15
U.S.C. §§77j(a), 77g, 77h and 77e(b) (1976) and I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6,
§§505(a), 502(c) and (d) and 504(a). Compare the wider usage in the Securities Act
of 1933, §2(10), 15 U.S.C. §77b(10) which usage is dropped in I ALl Fed. Sec. Code.
op. cit., (see §202(127)) as §503(a), Comment (3) explains. In the 1933 Act, the
"prospectus" (narrower sense) is part of a larger document, called a "registration statement," which must be filed in new issue situations: Ratner, Securities Regulation in a
Nutshell (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1978) [hereinafter Ratner] at 33. In 1 ALl Fed.
Sec. Code, op. cit., this scheme is carried forward, the "prospectus" being part of -a
document called an "offering statement": I ALI Fed. Sec. Code, § 502(c), op. cit. The
ALl Fed. Sec. Code, op. cit., retains the term "registration statement," but rather
confusingly puts it to another use: to denote the document filed when the continuous
disclosure scheme in the Code is entered; see Part VC of the text, infra.
14 Ratner, supra note 13, at 32, 34; Alboini, Ontario Securities Law (Toronto:
De Boo, 1980) [hereinafter Alboini] at 360-70.
15 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 406-409 and Baillie, "Remarks to National
Investor Relations Institute--Canada Friday, February 22, 1980," O.S.C.W.S. 22 February, 1980, Supp. "X" [hereinafter Baillie (1980)] at 2 (on Ontario and U.S. federal
law); 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 61-62; and 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6,
at xxvii-xxviii. "Special occasion" disclosure and "continuous disclosure" are from the
seminal article, Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited (1966), 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340
[hereinafter Cohen] at 1340-41. For a description of the primary and secondary capital
markets in Canada, see Williamson, "Canadian Capital Markets" (1978), in 3 Proposals,
supra note 1, [hereinafter Williamson (1978)] at 5-25.
10 See Part IV B3 of the text, infra.

17 See Part VI of the text, infra.
18 Ontario's legislation is used without any attempt to indicate the (often considerable) divergencies in other provinces and the federal territories. This is because,
at the time of writing, Ontario's is the most recently revised and likely to be the major

influence on securities reform across the country: Buckley, Small Issuers under The
Ontario Securities Act, 1978: A Plea for Exemptions (1979), 29 U. Toronto L.J. 309
[hereinafter Buckley] at 310n. 6 and text of that note. None of the reform proposals
has been enacted as of the time of writing.
10 For the influence of the present U.S. federal scheme of securities regulation on
Ontario, see Simmonds, Directors' Negligent Mis-statement Liability in a Scheme of
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continue to exercise, an important influence on this country. The particular
focus will, however, be on the Proposalswith their Draft Act, 20 Commentary
on the Draft Act 21 and lengthy Background Papers. 22 While the Draft Act's
passage into law must be a matter of some doubt,23 the Act and its superb
Commentary and Background Papers provide a new standard by which to
judge Canadian securities regulation. A theme important to this article that
emerges particularly from a reading of the Proposals is the complexity of
securities regulation and its dependence on administrative action for adjustment to changes in perceptions of the needs of the capital markets-in particular the primary markets. A related emergent theme is the uncertainty surrounding those needs, which has important implications for the spirit in which
the administrative authorities go about their tasks.
II. PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE POLICY
Prospectus regulation of the modern sort took some time to become a
legal staple after legislation in the United Kingdom first mandated disclosure

by large business entities.24 However, the legal system had earlier required

disclosure in other ways for both existing and prospective security-holders in
a new issue. Historical research done for the Proposals revealed the earliest
disclosure requirements in the constating documents of the forerunners of the

twentieth century business corporation u3 The use of voluntary documentary

sales aids in flotations, the forerunners of today's formal prospectus document,2 6 attracted a judicial concern with defective disclosure that bid fair to
become a full disclosure requirement.2 7 However, the courts soon resiled from
Securities Regulation (1979), 11 Ottawa L. Rev. 633 [hereinafter Simmonds] at 645,
649 and references in 645nn. 87-89 and 649n. 128. For the influence of the ALI Code,
POD, supra note 5 and ALl Code, Supp. to POD, supra note 5, on 1 Proposals,supra
note 3, see the "Sources" notes to the sections in the latter.
20 1 Proposals,supranote 3.
21 2 Proposals,supranote 3.
22 3 Proposals,supranote 1.
23 1 Proposals,supra note 3, at viii says: "The Proposals are intended as a discus-

sion document to facilitate the formulation by the Government of Canada of its policy
on the regulation of the Canadian securities market."
Initial reaction to the Proposalsfrom Ontario, the single most significant province
in the regulatory area, has been very cool: statement of [Ontario's] Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations, November 28, 1979 in O.S.C.W.S. 30th November,
1979 at 5A. The present state of federal-provincial relations, absent a major catastrophe
in the financial markets, would seem likely to remain unpropitious to any major unilateral federal initiative along the lines of the Proposals for the foreseeable future. But
see Catherwood, Business Speaks out on the Constitution, Financial Post, September 6,
1980 (survey of 107 companies: 73% of respondents favoured federal participation in
securities regulation).
24 The British legislation was the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (U.K.), which is discussed in Grover and Baillie,
supra note 11, at 364-65, and which lacked a "prospectus" requirement of the sort here
discussed. Although any written solicitation material given to investors had to be filed
at a central registry, specification of the contents of any such document was lacking.
25 Id. at 359-61.
26
Id. at 362.
27

Id. at 362, 365.
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that position to one allowing that the new issue purchase contract was not one
not even to be measured against
uberrimaefidei. The voluntary prospectus was 28
too exacting a standard of literal truthfulness.
Against this background, and following a stock exchange boom and bust,
the first statutory provisions setting minimum contents standards for new issue
documents appeared in 1867 in the United Kingdom.29 Similar legislation in
the United States and Canada came much later.2 0 In fact, in both jurisdictions
the earliest disclosure requirements were oriented to the secondary markets.
It was not until the early twentieth century that legislatively mandated new
issue disclosure surfaced. 31 However, the dominant approaches to regulation
of the securities markets in the two countries were the consideration by administrators of non-exempt new issues to determine if the issue merited public
sale and the control of the more egregious types of promoters' misrepresentation.32 It was not until the American Securities Act of 193333 first brought investor protection legislation to the federal level that the British disclosure
philosophy was moved to prominence in North America. 34 The American
scheme was closely followed by a call,m not for the last time,36 for a federal
initiative in securities regulation in Canada. But no such initiative was made.
Instead, the disclosure philosophy made its influence felt in the provincial
securities laws enacted after 1933.37 The philosophy's influence has grown
since then. In particular, although merit and misrepresentation-or "antifraud"-regulation continue to play a role in provincial securities laws, the
major thrust of modem securities reform, provincial and now in the federal
Proposals, has moved disclosure to centre stage while making it more cost
effective.38 In light of historical development, it may be quaeried at this point
if there is anything necessary or desirable in this central role.
In fact there is now a significant body of literature, largely American, on
this question, 39 which emanates principally from economists and lawyers,
28 Id. at 365; and see, e.g., Bellairs v. Tucker (1884), 13 Q.B.D. 562 (Div. Ct.)
esp. at 90 per Denman J.; Central Ry. Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch (1867), L.R. 2 H.L.
99 at 113, 36 L.J. Ch. 849 at 852, 16 L.T. 500 at 501 per Lord Chelmesford L.C.
29 The Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131, s. 38 (U.K.).
30 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 365, 367.
31Id. at 367 (Canada); Loss, 1 Securities Regulation (2d ed. Boston: Little,

Brown, 1961) [hereinafter 1 Loss] at
32 Grover and Baillie, supra note
33 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
34 Grover and Baillie, supra note

25-27.
11, at 369.

(1933).

11, at 369-71.
351d. at 371-72 (combining both "blue sky" and disclosure elements).
36 Id. at 373.
37 Id. at 372.
38 See OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, at paras. 1.19-1.27; cf. 2 Proposals,
supra, note 3, at 59-60.
39
The major references can be- gathered from Saari, The Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry (1977), 29
Stan. L. Rev. 1031 [hereinafter Saari]; Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under
the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code (1979), 33 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1471 [hereinafter Benston]; Kripke, Securities Law Reform and the ALl Federal
Securities Code (1979), 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1453 [hereinafter Kripke (1979)] at

1465n. 63.
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some of it even sponsored by the securities regulators themselves. 40 The literature does not argue with the basic premise of disclosure philosophy: that securifles require for their accurate valuation information on the affairs of the
issuer, information which will thereby protect investors. This notion can be
traced back at least as far as the English Board of Trade Report by William
Gladstone which preceded the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Registration and
Regulation Act4 The literature also does not quarrel with the later development of that notion which affirms the utility of adequate information in seeing
that capital is directed to its most efficient uses. 42 What the critical literature
does is quarrel with the way securities legislation has responded to this premise.
The most fundamental criticism is directed at legislatively mandating any
disclosure from issuers, whether primary or secondary market disclosure.43
The criticism is founded largely on the strongest form of an hypothesis about
securities price formation developed in the United States and extensively tested
there: that securities prices fully reflect all the information to be had about an
44
issuer, including information not yet disclosed in mandated disclosure filings.
This can be explained by citing an issuer's incentive to disclose voluntarily to
avoid investors demanding uncertainty premiums in their desired rates of
return, the trading activity flowing from the competitive efforts of analysts to
ferret out information for their clients and also perhaps trading activity by the
issuer's insiders.4- Tests in the United States in both the primary and secondary
markets have so far produced results mostly, but not entirely, consistent with
the hypothesis.4 6 A review of research done for the Proposalsshows that less
work has been done in this country. 47 What Canadian data there are seem
more equivocal. Because there may be proportionately fewer financial analysts in this country, and generally thinner capital markets, 48 there is reason
40The most significant example in recent years is the Report of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Com-

mittee Print 95-29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report], discussed in Kripke, Where Are We on Securities Disclosure After the Advisory

Committee Report? (1978), 6 Sec. Reg. L. J.99 [hereinafter Kripke (1978)]. See also
Williamson (1978), supra note 15.
41 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (U.K.). The report [hereinafter the Gladstone Report] is
digested in Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England 1800-1867

(New York: Russell & Russell, 1969) at 92-94, to which all subsequent page references
refer.
42 See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. at 2-3 (1933) [hereinafter H. R.
Rep. No. 85], quoted in Saari, supra note 39, at 1032n. 7 and Ont., Report of the
Attorney-General's Committee on Securities Regulation in Ontario (Kimber Report)

(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965) [hereinafter Kimber Report] at paras. 1.06, 1.07.
43 For a collection of the arguments and citations to supporting data, see Saari,
supra note 39; Benston, supra note 39; and Lothian, The Role of Government in the
Securities Market (1979), 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1587.
44

Saari, supra note 39, at 1039, 1041-54.

45 ld.at 1065, 1054-56.
46 Id. at 1041-54. There is serious debate over the strength of the support the
hypothesis draws from those data, however, especially in the area of mandated disclosure
for the primary capital markets: compare Saari, id. at 1058nn. 135, 136 with Williamson
(1978), supra note 15, at 61-62.

Williamson (1978), id. at 31.
48 See the references collected in Simmonds, supra note 19, at 677n. 316.
47
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to think that at least some segments of our primary and secondary markets
are less informationally efficient than the American-in particular the mining
and oil markets. 49 In those segments at least a convincing case against legislatively mandated disclosure has yet to be made.
But the evidence on mining and oil issuers' securities can be read to
make a case for merit regulation. The case would go as follows: capital is a
scarce commodity. At least a significant body of investors in mining and oil
securities seem to be investing despite evidence that returns decrease as risks
rise, because they see investment in those stocks as a gambling opportunity311
More information may have no significant effect on their preferences. It might
therefore be argued that securities regulators should intercede, not to demand
more information, but to deny those investors access to such investments.
However, while some evidence exists that merit regulation might have a
valuable role to play in the administration of the securities laws,-- at the least
such regulation would seem to demand the sort of case-by-case exercise of2
administrative discretion which is extremely expensive in manpower terms.
In fact, the pattern of regulation in the United States and Canada has been to
have merit regulation supplement, rather than substitute for, disclosure."-,
Until a better case for merit regulation, and against disclosure, is made, this
seems likely to continue.
A different response to the efficient market evidence, or lack of it, is
contained in a background paper on disclosure done for the Proposals.'
Grover and Baillie argue that even if it is accepted that the capital markets do
not always need mandated disclosure for securities valuation purposes, such
disclosure has other valuable purposes to serve. Those purposes derive from
the fact that only the larger businesses feel the full weight of securities laws'
disclosure requirements! 5 In light of that fact, disclosure serves to signal early
the advent (to both law enforcers and to the business concerned) of major
financial "scandal," and thus reduce its incidence or effect. Disclosure also
serves to address popular concerns about secretiveness in our society. ' 6 Investors, by divesting, may avoid impending scandals. However, they may not
have a share in the general social concern about secretiveness, especially in
Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 31-32.
But see Connelly, Fixed Versus Negotiated Commission Rates on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (1977), 2 Can. Bus. L. J. 244 [hereinafter Connelly (1977)] at 247 (suggesting there may be too much research activity in Canada at present).
5Yo
Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 32.
51 Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirement?, [1976] Wis.
L. Rev. 79, criticized in Buckley, supra note 18, at 318-19n. 48.
52 Cf. Johnston, Canadian Securities Regulation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977)
[hereinafter Johnston] at 160.
53 Id.; Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 393-94.
54 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11.
5 See Part VI (continuous disclosure scheme's impact).
5 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 384-85. See also Report of the Royal
Commission on Corporate Concentration (R.B. Bryce, Chairman) (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 1978) at 321-23,
4'"
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light of the possibility, recognized explicitly in Ontario's securities laws,17
that certain kinds of disclosure can produce political or other responses which
will reduce the return on their investments.
There is, in the work of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in
the United States, recognition of this view of the purposes of disclosure. The
classic example in recent times is the controversial SEC response in the foreign corrupt payments area."8 However, it is significant to note that the suggestion of Grover and Baillie on a broader view of the purposes of disclosure
does not seem to have been acted upon in the Proposals." Apart from the
question whether mandated disclosure for investors in fact has the broader
value those authors ascribed to it, it is difficult to see why securities regulators,
traditionally concerned with investor protection and efficient capital markets,
are well suited to developing disclosure to effect that broader value.60
Although no convincing case has yet been made in Canada against legislatively mandated disclosure, there is another related line of criticism that
is not as easily dealt with. This criticism does not quarrel with the value of
mandated disclosure in general, or prospectus disclosure in particular. Rather,
it concerns itself with the form of required disclosure and the notion in the
securities laws that a prospectus document must be delivered to investors in
a form intelligible to them."' This criticism calls for clearer recognition that
investors do not and should not 2 decide to invest without expert financial
advice. The purveyors of such advice have access to greater information about
the merits of the investment-especially its comparative merit-than a prospectus could provide. Prospectuses should be designed for those experts with
that constraint in mind. This in turn would result in less conservativism, especially significant for a disclosure document traditionally designed to counteract selling pressures.P It would also mean less simplification of complex information, fewer omissions of more speculative or uncertain matters (so called
57

See The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 46, s. 74(2); Grover and Baillie,
supra note 11, at 388.
58
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 40, at 695-99, 733-34; Note, Dis.
closure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials under the Securities Acts (1976),
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1848.
59 Compare Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 3 84-85 with I Proposals,supra
note 3, s. 1.02 (purposes of Draft Act).
60 This does not deny the virtue of a willingness by the regulators to allow for the
concerns of other government policy-makers to the extent the regulators can do so
consistently with their main mission: see Garrett and Weaver, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Code (1977), 30 Vand. L. Rev. 441 [hereinafter Garrett
and Weaver] at 448-49.
61 The single most significant author in this field has been Professor Kripke of the
Faculty of Law, New York University: see references collected in Kripke (1979),
supra note 39, at 1465n. 63.
62 Kripke (1978), supra note 40, at 111, 116-20; but see Saari, supra note 39, at
1071.
63 Kritke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities (1970), 45
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151 [hereinafter Kripke (1970)] at 1188-1201 and Kripke. A Search
for a More Meaningful Securities DisclosurePolicy (1975), 31 Bus. Law 293 at 314-16.
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"soft" information), such as earnings projections, and consequential loosen4
ing of the rigidity in format and content of required disclosure documents.
The major response to this line of criticism appears to be phrased in
terms of a conception of investor equality, based on equal direct access to information about an issuer. 65 This in turn is commonly linked to preserving
investor confidence in "fair" securities markets. 6 However, the evidence suggests that investors' confidence in the fairness of securities markets may not
significantly derive from their access to mandated disclosure.0 7 It indicates
that investors are most interested in "fair prices"; that is, prices that reflect fully
all that there is to be known relevant to valuation, with what that implies about
access to information for those whose judgments determine that valuation. If
there is recognition in the securities laws of Canada that at least some forms
of required disclosure are inappropriate for the goal of equally informed investors, such recognition appears in those laws' evolving continuous disclosure
systems. 8
III. CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE AND PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE
While the single most significant required disclosure document is undoubtedly the prospectus, continuous disclosure has received much greater
attention from securities reformers since the mid-1960's. 0 Historically, statutorily required periodic disclosure preceded the prospectus and served to inform shareholders in the exercise of their corporate franchise as well as those
making or advising others in the making of investment decisions. 70 However,
subsequent greater regulatory attention to the prospectus is quite understandable. A direct benefit to the issuer is discernible in the new issue to warrant a
special disclosure effort, where no such benefit is discernible for secondary
market trades. 71 (The exception concerns trades by control persons where
prospectus requirements have in fact also traditionally been applied.72 ) Related to the matter of direct benefit is the fact that the primary markets rather
than the secondary ones perform the function of allocating resources among
competing business uses. 73 An often articulated goal of securities regulation is
the enhancement of the capital market's ability to perform that function,
through more and better information, and the improvement in public partici0

4 Saari, supra note 39, at 1061-62.
05 Id. at 1032-34; Kimber Report, supra note 42, at paras. 1.11, 1.12.
06 H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at 2, quoted in Securities and
Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors: a Re-Appraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts (Wheat Report) (Washington: CCH, 1969) at
50; Kimber Report, supra -note 42, paras. 1.11, 1.12.
07 Saari, supra note 39, at 1071; Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 28, 30-32.
68 See also note 552, infra.
09 See the references in note 15, supra.
70 See Gladstone Report, supranote 41, at 92-94.
71 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 391.
72 Id., and see text accompanying notes 128 et seq., infra.
73 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 390.
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pation that would flow from better information, inter alia, raising the level of
public confidence in the market.34
However, securities regulators have also come to perceive clearly that
efficient primary markets presuppose efficient secondary ones. 78 Secondary
market trading helps establish for an issuer the rate of return it should offer
on future new issues. 76 Also, secondary markets provide investors with liquidity which helps to maximize the number of potential investors in new issues
and hence keep down an issuer's cost of capital. 77 A much simpler reason
also exists: the number of investors who participate in the secondary markets
vastly exceeds the number of those in the primary ones. 78 The outgrowth
of this appreciation is a desire to reduce the disparity between required new
issue disclosure and required continuous disclosure.- "
While this effort engages the criticisms of the disclosure philosophy canvassed above, one finds no attempt by the regulators to ensure required disclosure documents reach the hands of secondary market investors other than
those already equity holders of the issuer."" Rather, the emphasis is on filing
disclosure documents for digestion and dissemination by, predominantly,
securities market professionals."'
The existence of improved continuous disclosure raises the question whether
there should be a reciprocal effect on new issue disclosure. For those issuers
providing continuous disclosure, should there be the same prospectus requirements as for those not providing such disclosure? The answer given here and
in the United States, where the question was first raised,"" is no, subject to
having an adequate continuous disclosure system in place. That is, some degree
of "integration"' 3 of the two disclosure systems may be appropriate, either
by doing away with the prospectus requirement altogether or making prospec-

74 See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra note 42. at 2-3; Kimber Report, supra note
42, paras. 1.06, 1.11, 1.12.
75 See, e.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 40, at 573, 616: Kimber Report, supra note 42, paras. 1.11, 1.12.
7" Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 29.

77

Id. at 30.

-8 Id.at 29.
71) Advisory Committee Report, supra note 40, at 601-16: OSC Disclosure Report,
supra note 9, paras. 2.05-2.08.
SOSEC (1974), supra note 7, at 34-35 and 17 C.F.R. s. 240.14c-3 (1979); Alboini,
supra note 14, at 528-29. But see 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 7.01, discussed in 2
Proposals,supra note 3, at 110-1 1 and I AL! Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §602(a) (2)
(other security holders).
81 SEC (1974), supra note 7, at 34-35; OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, paras.
2.08, 2.09, 2.46, 2.47. But see I AL! Fed. Sec. Code. supra note 6, §602(a)-(d) Comment (2) (annual report delivered to stockholders coming to be "central device for
continuous disclosure"). See also note 552, infra.
82
The seminal publication was Cohen. supra note 15: for Ontario. see, e.g., Baillie
(1980), supra note 15, at 2.
8:3
For its usage in this context see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, throughout the
article; OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9. paras. 2.06, 2.18.
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tus disclosure less onerous. The "integration" notion itself, however, is only
acceptable if continuous disclosure, mediated by securities professionals, is at
all a substitute for the prospectus document delivered into an investor's hands.
The "integration" one notices in the prospectus requirements thus represents
a surprisingly unacknowledged8 4 shift in emphasis in the regulators' perception
of the role of the prospectuses of at least continuously reporting issuers.
IV. THE PROSPECTUS REQUIREMENT: THE BASIC PROHIBITION
A.

Introduction
The Securities Act, 1978, like its predecessor, operates through a broad
prohibition that has its ambit reduced by a network of exemptions."' ' The prohibition is backed up by a "draconic" set of sanctions designed to ensure that
a prospectus is filed if one is required and no exemption is available, and that
the filed prospectus makes its way into the hands of investors in the new
issue.86 The purpose of this section is to examine the basic contours of the
prohibition in the Act, the Proposalsand the ALI Code. The examination of
the last will make necessary a brief review of the present American federal
scheme of securities regulation, the exeprience upon which the ALl Code, the
Proposalsand the Ontario Act have built.
B.

Present Legislation in Ontario

I.

Introduction
The prohibition under the 1978 Act triggers special occasion prospectus
disclosure in one way for the first eighteen months after its coming into force
and in another way thereafter. Until 15 March 1981, the end of the transitional period, no one may "trade in a security... where such trade would be
a distribution to the public of such security ... unless a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been filed and receipts therefore obtained from the
Director [of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC)]. 8' 7 On and after 15
March 1981, the prohibition is engaged "where such trade would be a distribution of such security" sinpliciter.11 For both periods, the terms "trade"
and "security" have the same broad statutory definitions.8 ' However, the
central term "distribution" is more narrowly defined in the first than the

14 The Advisory Committee Report, supra note 40. comes close, but cannot bring
itself to admit the point, at xxxvi-xxxix: cf. Kripke (1978). supra note 40. at 110-12

and Kripke (1970), supra note 63, at 1165.
85 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47. ss. 52. 71-73, as am. by S.O. 1979,

c. 86, s. 10; The Securities Act. R.S.O. 1970, c. 426. ss. 35. 58 and 59, as am. by S.O.
1971. c. 31, ss. 13 and 14. rep. by S.O. 1978. c. 47. s. 142, in force 15 September 1979.
16 Buckley, sipra note 18. at 311-16: the quoted adjective is from 311.
S7 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O.
1978, c. 47. s. 52(1 )(a). in force 15 September
1979. The terms "trade." "security." "distribution to the public." "distribution" and
"Director" are defined in ss. (I )42. 40. 14. I1 and 9. respectively. The office of the
Director is dealt with in s. 6; the OSC is principally dealt with in Pait 1.
I The Securities Act. 1978. S.O. 1978. c. 47. s. 52( I )(b).
•: See Alboini. supia note 14. at 74-77 ("trade") and 27-72 ("security").
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second period"0 and the phrase "distribution to the public" appears only for
the transitional period. In that state of affairs resides the 1978 Act's major
prospectus regulation changes from its predecessor legislation, The Securities
Act, introduced in 1966.91 Here one finds the basic architecture for the
"closed system" which is a mark of the reform movement that began in the
United States and has its expression in the federal securities regulation scheme
and in the proposed Federal Securities Code to replace it.02 The Ontario

provisions represent its first statutory expression in Canada while the federal
Proposals represent a further development. 93 To understand the reform one
must understand4 the statutory background on both sides of the border that
gave birth to it.
2.

The Background to the Closed System: the 1966 Act and the Transitional Period.
As it is mirrored in the 1978 Act's transitional provisions, the prohibition in Ontario's 1966 Act is a good starting point. Under the 1966 Act no
one could "trade in a security ...where such trade would be in the course
of distribution to the public until there ha[s] been filed with the Commission
both a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus... and receipts therefor
obtained from the director." 95 This was subject to a scheme of exemptions
on which the 1978 Act extensively draws. 9 r "Distribution to the public," the
90 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)Il, concluding clause.

91 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, as am. by S.O. 1971, c. 31, S.O. 1972,
c. 1, and S.O. 1973, c. 11, rep. by S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 142, effective 15 September 1979.
92 See Emerson, Vendor Beware: The Issue and Sale of Securities Without a Prospectus under The Securities Act, 1978 (Ontario) (1979), 57 Can. B. Rev. 195 [hereinafter Emerson (1979)] at 195-97, esp. at 195-96 (the "closed system"). "Closed system"
is a term nolj often used to describe the American legislation present or proposed. But
see 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 92.
93 The Ontario system was not without a series of tentative expressions beginning
with The Securities Act, 1972, Bill 154 (2nd Sess., 29th Legis. Ont.), which is discussed in
Emerson, "An Integrated Disclosure System for Ontario Securities Legislation," in Ziegel,
ed., 2 Studies in Canadian Company Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1973) [hereinafter Emerson (1973)]. Bill 154 was succeeded by The Securities Act, 1974, Bill 75 (4th Sess., 29th
Legis. Ont.); The Securities Act, 1975, Bill 98 (5th Sess., 29th Legis. Ont.), discussed
in Bray, Ontario'sProposed Securities Act: an Overview-Its Purposes and Policy Premises, [1975] O.S.C.B. 235 and Dey, Securities Reform in Ontario: The Securities Act,
1975 (1975), 1 Can. Bus. L.J. 20 [hereinafter Dey (1975)]; The Securities Act, 1977,
Bill 20 (4th Sess., 30th Legis. Ont.), taken account of throughout Johnston, supra note 52:
and Bill 20's identical replacement, The Securities Act, 1977, Bill 30 (lst Sess., 31st
Legis. Ont.).
The federal Proposals do not create a "closed system" in the same way as the
Ontario Act; but they represent a variation on the theme. See the text following note
228, infra; cf. 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 93.
94 For recent general studies of that background legislation, see, e.g., Johnston,
supra note 52 (Ontario); Ratner, supra note 13 (the American scheme).
95 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 35(1). The terms "trade," "security,"
"Commission" and "Director" are defined in ss. 1(1)24, 22, 3 and 6, respectively, and
"distribution to the public" in s. 1(1)6a, added by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 1(2). The
Commission is principally dealt with in ss. 2 and 3; the office of Director is dealt with
in s. 4.
96See Parts V BI and 2, infra.
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term the 1978 Act uses but not with the same meaning for the transitional
period, was defined in a complex way. That definition can be divided into
two parts.
The first part dealt with trades "for the purpose of distributing to the
public securities issued by a company and not previously distributed to the
public." An extension stipulated that this was "whether such trades are made
directly.., or indirectly.., through an underwriter or otherwise, and includes any.., series of transactions involving a purchase and sale or a re97
purchase and resale in the course of or incidental to such distribution."
On the face of it, this was directed at new issue situations, including within
these extensions to underwritings where the underwriter purchased the issue
as principal and resold. 8 What that reading misses, however, is the second
set of words emphasized: "not previously distributed to the public." 99 What
this seemed to contemplate was the possibility of a "distribution" to persons
who were non-"public," who later resold to "public" purchasers in what
would then be a "distribution to the public."''4 This fairly obvious result
of a lawyer's close reading of statutory text was not entirely undisputed,
however.' 0 ' The basis for the dispute was the definition of "public"; the
term's elimination from the 1978 Act's basic prohibition after the transitional
period must be counted one of that Act's major accomplishments.
The qualification of the prospectus requirement by reference to the involvement of "public" purchasers goes back to early English companies legislation 12 and is also found in the American federal securities scheme. There
it appears in an exemption from the prohibition in the Securities Act of 1933
on any one using the mails for the purpose of, or to use any means or instruments of interstate commerce for the purpose of, or for delivery after, the
sale of any "security," "unless a registration statement is in effect as to [that]
security."' 0 3 The relevant exemption to this prohibition
is for "transactions
10 4
by an issuer not involving any public offering."'

07

In s. l(1)6a, added by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 1(2). [Emphasis added.]
This extension is discussed later, together with the "or otherwise" and "any series
of transactions" wording: see notes 135, 145 and text accompanying those notes, infra.
90The original wording, "not previously distributed," was changed to that quoted
by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 1(2), the background to which is in Grover and Baillie, supra
note 11, at 417.
100 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 417 and references in 417n. 288.
101 Id.
102 Companies Act 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48 (U.K.), s. 9 read with s. 30 ("prospectus"). The first Ontario legislation to use the "public" desideratum in this context appears to have been The Ontario Companies Act, 1912, 2 Geo. V, c. 31, s. 99(l).
103Securities Act of 1933, §5(a), 15 U.S.C. §77e(a) (1976). This is the part
most readily comparable to Ontario's of a complex prohibition. A short summary
is in Ratner, supra note 13, at 39-48. "Security" is defined in Securities Act of 1933,
§2(1), 15 U.S.C. s. 77b(l) (1976); "sale" in §2(3), 15 U.S.C. §776b(3) (1976).
For the relationship between the Act's "registration statement" and its "prospectus," see
note 13, supra.
104 Securities Act of 1933, §4(2), 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) (1976).
98
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At one time the OSC took the position that the term "public" in the
1966 legislation was meant to include "everyone" or, at least, everyone without an exemption. 10 5 The widest such reading, made before the words "to
the public" were added to the "not previously distributed" phrase, would
drain those words of virtually all meaning. 10 6 For that reason, and in the face
of what limited jurisprudence there is on point,O7 both readings seem wrong
for the later form of the definition. 108 What was not clear is what "public"
did mean.
It is fair to say that the quest for a definition of "public" was the source
of the major operational uncertainty in the 1966 Act. 09 Lawyers could draw,
as some courts did, on the rich store of American judicial and administrative
learning on the subject in the 1933 Act. The American material sees the
term focusing on the purchaser's need for the informational and other protections of the Act. 110 This in turn is seen to make relevant the number of
offerees; their access to information equivalent to mandated new issue disclosure, in the sense of their power to demand such information or in the
sense of their actually having received it; their sophistication in the sense of
their ability to use the information; and their "economic status."'u 1 Each of
these has its interpretive difficulty 112 and their weighting is not altogether
clear. 113 In Ontario, difficulties were compounded by the fact that, even if
this material is the source of the "leading" 114 test of "public," its precise
Ontario application might have needed to be different. In particular, tests
of access to information, sophistication and economic status might have

105 The widest view is in OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 8.01; the
narrower view is referred to in Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 417, and OSC
Disclosure Report, op. cit., para. 3.18. For an earlier OSC view, also extremely broad,
see Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1960) [hereinafter Williamson (1960)] at 121.
106 But not of all meaning: see the wqrd "distributed," discussed in Dey, "Exemptions under the Securities Act of Ontario," [1972] Law Society of Upper Canada Special
Lectures Corporate and Securities Law (Toronto: De Boo, 1972) 127 [hereinafter Dey
(1972)] at 141.
107 See id. at 134.

108 Accord Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 417 and authorities cited in 417n.
288. See also S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 13(2).
109 See Dey (1975), supra note 93, at 22. Cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 148. But
see also Chapman, "The Securities Act, 1978 and the Occasional Practitioner: the
Private Company Exemption is not for the Meek," in [1980] Recent Securities and
Corporate Law Developments (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, Ontario, 1980)
[hereinafter Chapman] at II 3.
110 See Buckley, supra note 18, at 331-38.
1M1Id. at 332-38 (the quotation is at 338).

112 Id.

113 See id. at 363; Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 139-40.
114 Buckley, supra note 18, at 331 (although the authorities he cites in 331n. 120
are equivocal on the point); contrast Alboini, supra note 14, at 288; Grover and Baillie,
supra note 11, at 410; Chapman, supra note 109 at 11 15; and R. v. Kiefer (1976), 6
W.W.R. 541 at 546 (B.C. Co. Ct.), per Ferry J., aff'd 70 D.L.R. (3d) 352, [1976] 4
W.W.R. 395 (Prov. Ct.). Only the first instance decision in Kiefer is referred by
Buckley at 331n. 120.
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needed to be applied more rigorously in Ontario than in the United States.

15

There those tests had been used in effect to provide exemptions for "private
placements"; that is, offerings of securities in large values to institutional
investors."16 Such transactions in both countries are very significant sources
of new issue financing." 7 Such excogitation is and has long been unnecessary
in Ontario with its specific exemptions for such issues,"18 carrying with them,
it may be argued, a narrowing of the scope of the non-"public."
To the uncertainties to which the "need to know" test gave rise in
Ontario could be added those arising from the other major test used in the
area: the "close friends or business associates" test." 9 This test was first

articulated in the context of an exemption from the licensing and prospectus
requirements similar to the one in the 1966 Act carried forward into the
1978 Act for trades in "securities of a private company issued by the private
company if the securities are not offered for sale to the public."' 2 0 One might
assert that the test should be restricted to the "private company"' 21 issuer,
to which its linguistic affiliation is clear. 22 In any event, the criteria of relationship that this test makes relevant are not obviously any easier to apply
than those under the "need to know" test.123 Also, if this test did apply to

the general prohibition as well as the "private company" exemption,
the
24
question arose of how to deal with a conflict between the two tests.

All of this interpretive difficulty remains under the 1978 Act, during
115 Cf. Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 138-39; Grover and Baillie, supra note 11,
at 410.
116 For a working definition of "private placement" transactions in the Ontario
context, see Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 415-16; for a narrower definition, see
Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 147. On "private placements" in the American context,
see Ratner, supra note 13, at 49-50.
117 See Ratner, id. at 50; 1980 O.S.C.B. at 31.
118Notes 316-18 and accompanying text, infra.
119 See Buckley, supra note 18, at 328-31; Alboini, supra note 14, at 288-96.
120 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 58(2) (a), incorporating by reference,
inter alia, s. 19(2)9, as am. by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s.13(2); The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1)(a), incorporating by reference, inter alia, s. 34(2)10. The
language of the latter exemption slightly differs from that of the former; see Alboini,
supra note 14, at 287-88. "Private Company" is defined in the former Act, in s.
1(1)14, in the latter Act, in s. 1(1)31. The relevant case is R. v. Piepgrass (1959),
23 D.L.R. (2d) 220, 29 W.W.R. 218 (Alta. C.A.); and see also R. v. Empire Dock Ltd.
(1940), 55 B.C.R. 34 at 38-39 (Co. CL). Piepgrass was referred to as the "leading
case" in R. v. Kiefer, supra note 114, at 546.
Caselaw not involving the application of such an exemption but referring with
approval to the test in the text or to Piepgrass is R. v. McKillop, [1972] 1 O.R. 164,
4 C.C.C. (2d) 290 (Prov. Ct.), and R. v. Cottrelle (1972), 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep., para.
70-024, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 30 (Ont. Prov. Ct.). See also Re Shelter Corp. of Canada, [1977]
O.S.C.B. 6 at 13, and Les Mines Chandor Ltie, Q.S.C.W.B. 5 June 1974, 1.
121 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 1(1) 141; The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)31.
122 But see the caselaw not involving application of the exemption cited, supra
note 119.
123 See Buckley, supra note 18, at 328-3 1.
124 Id. at 363; Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 138.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

19, NO. I

the transitional period only, with its "distribution to the public" prohibition.
During both the transitional and the post-transitional period it remains in the
context of the private company exemption examined below. '12 The major
difference between the first limb of the 1966 Act's application and the corresponding part of the transitional provisions in the 1978 Act 120 is the deletion of "not previously distributed to the public" in the former. That phrase
seemed to require multiple applications of the "public" concept to determine
where, along the chain of transactions starting with the issue of the securities,
the first "public" purchasers appeared. 127 This exercise was likely to be
fraught with evidentiary uncertainties, in proportion to the number of removes from the issuer at which a purchaser who proposed to resell found
himself. On that exercise's outcome depended the answer to the question
whether a prospectus was needed for a secondary market transaction.
A respectable precedent for the application of prospectus requirements
to secondary, in addition to primary, market transactions has long existed in
Ontario and the United States. This is represented by the second part of the
1966 Act's definition of "distribution to the public," requiring a prospectus
for non-exempt
trades in previously issued securities for the purpose of distributing such securities
to the public where the securities form all or a part of or are derived from the
holdings of any person, company or combination of persons or companies holding
a sufficient number of any of the securities of a company to naterially affect the
control of such company. 128 [Emphasis added.]

The interpretive difficulty caused by the use of the control concept 12 is relieved by the inclusion in that second limb of a presumption of material
effect on control for a twenty percent of outstanding "equity shares"' 3 0 holding
or combination of holdings. The rationales for applying the prospectus requirement to control person trades to the "public" are:
(1) the control person's presumptive access to information not available to
others coupled with
(2) his ability to "manage" the issuer's news;
(3) the likelihood of his sale being large and hence accompanied by significant selling efforts which a mandatory disclosure document delivered
to investors might counter; and
125 Text

accompanying notes 365-71, infra.
The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)14, read with s. l(1)lli also
s. 1(1)llii (trades by issuer in previously issued securities redeemed by or donated to
it), discussed by Alboini, supra note 14, at 6. For discussion of the other parts, see
notes 154, 155 and 180 and text accompanying those notes, infra.
127 See Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 140-43.
128 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 1(1)6a ii, added by S.O. 1970, c. 31,
s. 1(2). This extension first appeared in Ontario in The Securities Act, 1945, S.O. 1945,
c. 22, s. l(1)(j)(ii). The corresponding provision in the U.S. is the Securities Act of
1933, §2(11), 15 U.S.C. s. 77b(11), discussed in this respect in the text accompanying
notes 138 and 139, infra.
129 See Johnston, supra note 52, at 144-47.
130 Defined in The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 1(1)7.
126
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(4) the fact that any departure of his from a131
control position is a significant
piece of investment information in itself.
The force of the second and fourth policies was substantially reduced if not
eliminated by the introduction into Ontario's securities laws of insider trading controls and an administrative policy calling for timely disclosure of all
material development in the issuer's affairs as those developments occur,
subject to an opportunity to keep the development confidential where appropriate. 3 2 The first policy is not clearly restricted to control persons, as the
American learning on the "need to know" test would indicate."l 3 And the
third element is clearly not restricted to them.
Hence, one could reason from the control person scheme to rationalize
the application of prospectus regulation to resales to the public by the last

in a chain of non-public purchasers. A more significant policy justification,
however, seems to have been the avoidance of two-stage distributions whereby
securities are moved out to the public through the "conduit" of non-public
purchasers. 134 At this point in the discussion, one may ask why the "underwriter" extension of "distribution to the public" did not catch this, for the
statutory definition of the term in 1966 did not require either that the "underwriter" be registered as such or be in the business of underwriting. An
"underwriter" was simply defined in material part as a "person or company
who, as principal, purchases securities from a person or company with a view
to, or who as agent for a person or company offers for sale or sells securities
in connection with, a distribution to the public of such securities .... 135
In fact, in the United States the equivalent provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933 were used for just this purpose. The "registration statement"
requirement is examined above in connection with the exemption for "trans131 OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 4.04. But the Act recognised that
a person may be a control person and yet not have sufficient access to information to
have a prospectus made up: see The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 60, as am.
by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 15.
132 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, Part XI, as am. by S.O. 1971, c. 31,
ss. 31-36, originally added by S.O. 1966, c. 142, Part XI; and De Boo, Ontario Securities 1978 with Regulation and Policy Statements (9th ed. Toronto: De Boo, 1979) at
336-37 (Uniform Act Policy 2-12), an amended version of an OSC policy statement first
appearing in O.S.C.W.S. 27 September 1968 at 1A-2A.
133 See its application to private places: text accompanying notes 110 and 117,
supra.
134 Cf. OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, paras. 5.02, 5.19, although on the
Commission's reading of the Act as it then stood the taking of securities under an
exemption impressed "public" status on the purchaser: op. cit., para. 5.18. Despite the
amendments to the Act made by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 13(2) this view apparently continued to command some adherents: Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 143-44; Grover
and Baillie, supra notre 11, at 417.
135 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 1(1)25, as am. by S.O. 1971, c. 31,
s. 1(4). But cf. Alboini, supra note 14, at 79-80. The registration requirement for
underwriters made its first appearance in Ontario in The Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966,
c. 142, s. 6(1)(d). It can be argued that only substantial purchasers should be covered,
particularly in light of this registration requirement: cf. 1 Loss, supra note 31, at 64243; but see also the definition of "distribution to the public" in s. 1(1 )6a, and compare
text accompanying note 138, infra.
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actions.., not involving any public offering." 136 On the face of it, that requirement sweeps in all secondary as well as primary market transactions
that had the necessary federal jurisdictional element. What cuts that requirement back most significantly for present purposes is the further exemption for
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 13
'
The term "underwriter" is defined very similarly to the Ontario one except
for an express extension of the term "issuer" in the definition to include control persons or persons under common control with the issuer and the use
of "distribution" for "distribution to the public."'138 The effect of the control
extension is to make the registration statement requirement applicable to
control person transactions through intermediaries.' 3 9 The decisional materials on the exemption are in large part concerned with persons who claimed
to take under the non-public offering exemption; ascribing "underwriter"
status to them would not only constrain their resale but also dissolve "retroactively" the original exemption. 140 Those materials saw as the litmus test for
"underwriter" status an intention on the part of the reseller at the time of
the original acquisition to hold the securities for investment and not for resale in a "public offering.' '4 The "investment intent" requirement rated on
a purchaser's motives rivalled "public" in the U.S. scheme for uncertainty in
2
application.14
There appear to be no judicial considerations of "underwriter" in the
Ontario scheme. As a matter of construction of the 1966 Act, it is arguable
that lack of "investment intent" in a purchaser from the issuer was a necessary but, at least in a "public" purchaser, 143 not a sufficient condition for
application of the prospectus requirement solely through the underwriter
limb. This is because of the purposive language in the 1966 definition of
"distribution to the public," which is not found in the American Act's requirement or the exemption to it, coupled with the words of section 1(1)6a:
"whether such trades are made directly.., or indirectly through an underwriter or otherwise, and includes any ...series of transactions involving a
136 Text

accompanying note 103, supra.
13Securities Act of 1933, §4(1), 15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1976). "Issuer" is
defined in Act, §2(4), 15 U.S.C. §77b(4) (1976); "dealer" in Act, §2(12), 15 U.S.C.

§77b(12) (1976). See generally I Loss (1961), supra note 31, at 641-53, Loss, IV
Securities Regulation (Supp. to 2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969) [hereinafter IV Loss]
at 2621ff.
138 For the meaning ascribed to "distribution," which is not statutorily defined, see
Buckley, supra note 18, at 339 ("synonymous with public offering"); and 1 Loss, supra
note 31, at 642-43 (probably restricted to purchasers of substantial blocks of securities).
See further note 135, supra.
139 The question whether the controlling person could be liable under this extension as well as his intermediary apparently was not settled until 1969: Jennings and
Marsh, supra note 7, at 306.
140 Buckley, supra note 18, at 339-40: the quotation is at 339.
'41 Id.; IV Loss, supra note 137, at 2580.
142 Buckley, supra note 18, at 340.
143 The distinction is drawn because a non-"public" purchaser who purchased with
a view to resales among members of the public could be said without further inquiry
to be looking to a "distribution to the public" (under the "not previously distributed
to the public" limb).
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purchase and sale.., incidental to such distribution."'1 44 It could be argued
that this required some element of collusion between "underwriter" and
issuer. 45 Furthermore, if catching a two step distribution through a "conduit"
is the major objective, the collusion requirement makes sense.'146
However, the collusion requirement makes less sense if, as American
materials stress, the concern is not so much the two-stage distribution, with
its implicit focus on a transfer of funds from the public to an issuer, but
preventing "the creation of public markets in securities of issuers concerning
which adequate current information concerning the issuer is not available to
the public.' 147 Interestingly, this rationale makes more sense in Ontario than
it does in the United States since, in the latter, "registration statement" qualification does not entail subjection to the continuous disclosure scheme of the
Securities Exchange Act, 1934.148 Prospectus qualification of an equity
issue
149
did entail subjection to the 1966 Act's continuous disclosure scheme.
144 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. l(1)6a added by S.O. 1971, c. 31,

s.1(2).
145 At least an intention by the issuer that the purchaser from it resell among
members of the public would suffice. The "or otherwise" language may even have made
the participation of an "underwriter" unnecessary. The resultant position would then
have been very similar to that under the British companies legislation: Gower et al.,
Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed. London: Stevens, 1979) at 352
(on then existing and proposed legislation). It is unlikely that any change in this respect
was made by The Companies Act, 1980 (Imp.); however, this author did not have
access to the statutory text to verify this. The difference from the American position
flows from the definition of "distribution to the public" in the Ontario legislation. It is
unclear if the "series of transactions" language adds anything; its primary application
is to stabilization trades in the course of formal underwritings; Baillie, The Protection
of the Investor in Ontario (1965), 8 Can. Pub. Admin. 172 at 186, and Johnston, supra
note 52, at 147; although it is not clearly so restricted.
146 It must be admitted that the reading has only faint support: see Johnston, supra
note 52, at 147, 197n. 217; OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 5.15. The contrary view simply requires an intention to resell among the public, apparently whether the
purchaser is "public" or not (contrast the author's view, supra note 143): Williamson
(1960), supra note 105, at 122; OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, paras. 5.17, 5.26;
Johnston, op. cit., at 80, 201. See also 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 42. It might be
argued that the extension only applied to registered underwriters (see The Securities Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 6(1)(d), the history of which is discussed by Meech, "Prospectus and Registration Requirements," in [1968] Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada (Toronto: De Boo, 1968) 211, at 213-15): cf. Alboini, supra note 14,
at 79-80, 487; Beattie et el., "Panel Discussion: The Closed System and How it Works:
Prospectuses; Reporting Issuers and Exemptions" in Law Society of Upper Canada,
New Securities Legislation (Toronto: L.S.U.C., 1978) [hereinafter Beattie et al.]
at 134
(Dey). But this is not beyond argument in light of the wording of the statute and the
fact that the 1966 Act's underwriter extension derived from The Securities Act, 1945,
1945, S.O. 9 Geo. VI, c. 22, s. 49(1) read with s. 1(1)(y), and before that The Ontario
Companies Act, 1912, 1912, S.O. 2 Geo. V, c. 31, s. 97(3), in both of which cases there
was no "underwriter" registration requirement.
147See, e.g., Rule 144, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, §19(a), 15
U.S.C. §77s (1976), in 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979), "Preliminary Note."
148 Seethe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 1, 78 o (1976).
149 See The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 118(1)(b)(i) as am. by S.O.
1971, c. 31, s. 37(2). The restriction to "equity securities" (defined in Act, s. 1(1)(7)
is discussed in OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, paras. 2.35, 2.36.
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Whether in Ontario the element of collusion was necessary or not, the
use of "not previously distributed to the public" in the definition served to
extend the prospectus requirement without involving the troublesome question of "investment intent." The problem of who were the "public" remained.
The question was particularly troublesome for the private placee. Unless it
was the case that simply because it fitted within a private placement exemption it was a "public" purchaser for the purpose of "distribution to the public,"150 the placee had to ensure that it was not reselling to, or that on the
original acquisition it had been, a "public" purchaser.
Even if a private placee did fit within an exemption, the policy rationales
discussed above for having prospectus-type controls on resales could still
apply to them, a state of affairs that the position in the United States recognized.' 5' Under the 1966 Ontario Act, this was recognized by attaching an
"investment intent" requirement to the other qualifications for the private
placement exemptions.1 52 This requirement is continued under the 1978 Act
for the transitional period' 53 as the sole prospectus requirement resale control in secondary market trading apart from the underwriter 5 4 and control
person' 55 extensions of "distribution" (the term also applicable to the posttransitional period).
3.

The Post-Transitional Period: The Closed System Arrives.
It is noted above that in the post-transitional period the words "to the
public" disappear from the prospectus triggering condition. Under the 1978
Ontario Act the issuer proposing to issue securities is remitted solely to the
exemptions. Two of these in large part were designed to compensate for the
loss of the 'exemption' implicit in the "public" concept and are new to Ontario's legislation. "0 However, neither is free of serious interpretive difficulty.
This is a view the OSC has held: see references in note 105, supra.
See Rule 144, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, §19(a), 15 U.S.C.
§77s(a) (1976).
52
1 See The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.426, s. 58(1)(a) and s.58(l)(b), as
substituted by S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 13(1) and read with s. 19(1)3 and 19(3), discussed
by Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 147-51.
153 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 143(2).
154 The "underwriter" extension is in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47,
ss. 1(1)14 and l(1)(ll)iv,v and last phrase, read with s. 1(1)43 ("underwriter": includes purchaser "with a view to distribution"). Except for s. l(1)(11)iv and v, the
deletion of "not previously distributed.to the public" and the change in the definition of
"underwriter" ("with a view to distribution" replacing "with a view to distribution to
the public"), the extension is identical to that in the earlier legislation, with its purposive, "whether direcly or indirectly.., through an underwriter or otherwise and also
1--)
'5'

includes any ... series of transactions involving a purchase and sale... incidental to a

distribution" language. On that language see supra note 145. The purpose of s. 1(1)(11)
iv and v is discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 488-89 (although the author disagrees
with the view Alboini appears to entertain that those sub-subparagraphs only apply to
registered underwriters: see supra note 146). If the author's argument derived from
the earlier legislation is correct, then s. 1(1) (I 1)v is probably unnecessary.
155 The "control person" extension is in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47,
s. 1(1)(11) iii, discussed and contrasted with the earlier legislation in Alboini, supra
note 14, at 505-507.
1u At least one is new as a distribution exemption: see Johnston, supra note 52,
at 221.
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Furthermore, the more important of the two is so hedged about with restrictions as to be of very little value.
The first of the two is the isolated trade transaction exemption. It is
modelled on an exemption in the 1966 Act that is on its face restricted to
transactions in previously issued securities, and applicable not to the prospectus requiring prohibition but to the licence requiring one.'57 The 1978
Act contains a prospectus exemption available to issuers, but not to holders
of previously issued securities, that will come into force only after the expiry
of the transitional period.",, The relevant trade must be "isolated," and
"not made in the course of continued and successive transactions of a like
nature, and.., not made by a person or company whose usual business is
trading in securities.' :
There is no corresponding provision to this one in present American federal securities legislation. However, state securities laws in the United States do
contain similarly worded new issue disclosure exemptions, on which there is
a comparatively large body of jurisprudence to contrast with the small body
of Canadian material. 16 As a recent Canadian review of the jurisprudence
on both sides of the border concluded, the better reading of the exemption
does not require the impossible of an issuer: a solitary issue. Rather, the
"continued and successive transactions" passage is taken as an explication of
"isolated," requiring that qualifying issues be single transactions each, with
single purchasers and of sufficiently different characters as not to form successive parts of a single plan. 161 As that analysis pointed out, the utility of
this exemption based on the American experience is likely to be very low6 2
since issuers will seldom feel confident about the exemptions applicability.'
Prima facie of more significance is the second of the two new exemptions: that for "limited offerings." Unlike the isolated transaction one, it applies during the transitional period also.Ie During that period it will function
as a "safe harbour" from the prospectus prohibition in much the same
manner as the provision from which it derives in the U.S. federal securities
laws. 164
157

The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. (19(1)2, discussed in Johnston, supra

note 52, at 122-26.
158

The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(b) rep. and re-enacted by

S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 9(1), and read with s. 143(2).
159 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s.71(1)(b).
'GO See Buckley, supra note 18, at 323-24. For the reason for the non-adoption of
the exemption under the present federal scheme, see Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933 (1959), 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29 at 37.

161 Buckley, supra note 18, at 323-24; and see 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 96-97.
162 Id. at 324, 325.
163 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(p), to be read with 0. Reg.
478/79, ss. 19 and 20 as am. by 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 7, promulgated under the power
contained in the Act, s.139.21, which is discussed in the text accompanying and following note 399, infra. However, during the transitional period, the exemption carries an
"investment intent" requirement: see s. 143(2).
164 I.e. it will enable the issuer to avoid the difficult task of determining if its
purchaser(s) are members of the "public." The American provision is in Rule 146,
made pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, §19(a), 15 U.S.C. §77s (1976), in 17
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That provision is Rule 146 made pursuant to the SEC's power under the
Securities Act of 1933 to make "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act], including rules and regulations.., defining accounting, technical and trade terms in this [Act]."1015
Rule 146 is the SEC's response to the interpretive uncertainties created by
the exemption to the registration statement requirement for "transactions...
not involving any public offerings." 14 Satisfaction of its requirements ensures
that the exemption is available. Failure to satisfy one or more of the requirements is not fatal, however, if the person claiming the benefit of the exemption can successfully invoke ordinary standards of statutory construction; 1 7
hence the "safe harbour" on which the 1978 Act extensively draws.
Again, a recent Canadian analysis of the limited offering exemption in
conjunction with its Rule 146 forbear 18s makes unnecessary a detailed
analysis here. As that analysis points out, the Ontario exemption is a "onceand-for-all" one,"19 unlike Rule 146 and the "public" jurisprudence. The
gravamen of the exemption is a limitation both on the number of offerees
that can be approached in the offering (to 50), and the number of purchasers that can result (25) .17' Only the latter type of limit (with 35 instead
of 25) applies under Rule 146.171 Numbers of offerees and purchasers were,
of course, only a factor, albeit a significant one, under the "public" jurisprudence. 7 2 Allied with the numbers limitation is a prohibition in the 1978
Ontario Act on the use of general advertising which has its analogue under
Rule 146.1'7
Coupled with the numbers limitation, however, is the major inhibiting
factor on the use of the limited offering exemption that both the 1978 Act
and Rule 146 share, derived directly from the "public" caselaw. This is the
eligibility rules for purchasers (offerees in Rule 146). They must all have
C.F.R. §230.146 (1979): see Buckley, supra note 18, at 343-44n. 202. See also the
SEC's then proposed Rule 242, referred to in Lang and Backman, The Federal Securities
Code in Flux: Limited Offerings and Tender Offers (1979), 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1551

[hereinafter Lang and Backman] at 1557n. 32, and now in force (see Chapman, supra
note 109, at II 7n. 38 and accompanying text).
16 See preceding note. For a Canadian reaction to this sort of provision, see 2
Proposals, supra note 3, at 347. The vires of this rule is apparently far from beyond
question: see Loss et al., Panel Discussion (1979), 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1519 at 153536 (Loss.).
100 Painter, supra note 9, at 14-15.
167 Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1979), "Preliminary Note" 1.
168 Buckley,

supra note 18, at 343-49. See also Alboini, supra note 14, at 299-301,

476-85.

169 This is probably the most severely criticized feature of the exemption: see
Buckley, supra note 18, at 349; Alboini, supra note 14, at 477.
17o This raises the problem of integration of what would otherwise be a limited
offering with other transactions, a long familiar problem to American lawyers: Buckley,
supra note 18, at 348.
17' 17 C.F.R. §230.146(g) (1) (1979). But there are qualifications which all offerees
must possess: see 17 C.F.R. §230.146(d) and (e) (1979).
172 Buckley, supra note 18, at 332-34.
173The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(l)(p)(iii); 17 C.F.R.
§230.146(c) (1979).
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access to (substantially) prospectus quality information 74 and the ability to
evaluate the information presented 75 unless (under the Ontario Act only)
they are senior officers or directors (or immediate family) of the issuer.' 76
Unless the investors are made senior officers or directors of the issuer' 77 this

does not represent very much of an advance on the "public" learning' 78
When this state of affairs is coupled with the "once-and-for-all" character 17of9
this exemption, it appears likely that the exemption will be seldom used.
It is the other major achievement of the 1978 Act that the "investment

intent" requirement disappears after the transitional period. In its place, the
definition of "distribution" is widened to include, inter alia, "the first trade
in securities previously acquired pursuant to [any of, inter alia, the isolated
trade, limited offering and private placement exemptions] other than a further
trade exempted by [subsection 71 (1) ]."180 This is unless the issuer is subject
to the continuous disclosure scheme and not in default under its requirements, and has been subject to those requirements for a stipulated period.
Also, the securities must have been held for a stipulated period, ranging from
six to eighteen months, since acquisition, or the date of subjection to the
continuous disclosure scheme, whichever is the later. Finally, no unusual
effort can be made to prepare the market and no extraordinary commission
can be made in respect of the trade; and reports of the original acquisition
and of the resale must be duly filed with the OSC.181
It is this extension which will, with a number of others for securities
8
acquired pursuant to other exemptions which for the most part resemble it,1 2
institute the "closed system" in Ontario. Securities issued to private placement-type purchasers can be traded among them but not outside their circle
174 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(p) (ii), and see 0. Reg.
190/80 s. 7, substituting new s. 20 for 0. Reg. 478/79 s. 20; 17 CYF.R. §230.146(e)
(1979). Both are discussed and contrasted in Buckley, supra note 18, at 344-46.
175 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, s. 71(1)(p)(ii)(a); 17 C.F.R. §230.146(d)
(1979). Both are discussed and contrasted in Buckley, supra note 18, at 346-47.
176 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, s. 71(1) (p) (ii) (b).
177 Recommended by Buckley, supra note 18, at 346; but quaere if the OSC might
not, if this manoeuvre became popular enough, intervene under The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 124(1): cf. Alboini, supra note 18, at 844-45.
178 See Buckley, supra note 18, at 349 and Alboini, supra note 14, at 484-85.
Compare the conclusion come to in relation to Rule 146 in Painter, supra note 9, at
14-16.
179 Accord Buckley, supra note 18, at 349; Alboini, supra note 14, at 485.
180 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)11 concluding words, read
with s. 71(4). But see also text following note 195, infra. Securities acquired under
other exemptions are covered by other extensions of "distribution": see ss. 71(5)-(7);
and see also 0. Reg. 478/79 s. 17 as am. by 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 5 (applying selected
resale controls from the Act to exemptions created by the Regulation). The s. 71(6)
extension is discussed in the text following note 195, infra. The s. 71(5) and (7)
extensions are discussed in the text following note 537, infra. Not all of the exemptions
in s. 71(1) discussed in the next section of the text by their terms can apply to resales:
see Alboini, supra note 14, at 493. There are a number of exemptions in the regulations
created for resale situations: see 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 16.
181 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(4) (a)-(c) and concluding
clause.82
i Supra note 180, and references there.
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unless the permitted resale rules are followed. The first, "reporting issuer"
rule, is the first taste of "integration" by the 1978 Act of the prospectus and
continuous disclosure schemes. 183 The second, is the establishment of a roadblock to two-stage distributions that is not dependent on the uncertainties of
"investment intent" or "collusion.' 8 4 It should be noted, however, that one
of the other extensions of distribution does not present such a feature.' 85 The
third is directed at large-scale resales with attendant special selling pressures
for which prospectus delivery to an investor is seen as a counter. 189 The
fourth, the reporting rules, keeps the regulators and the marketplace
in87
formed of the change in the "float" of the reporting issuer's securities.'
These requirements derive from the American response to the uncertainties of "investment intent" in the 1933 Act, coupled with the drive to
upgrade the quality of the continuous disclosure scheme and to harmonize
the new issue one with it.18s This response took the form of the SEC's Rule

144,189 which provided pursuant to the SEC's power by rule to provide
definitions, 9 0 an interpretation of "distribution" in the statutory definition
of "underwriter."' 9 ' Each one of the requirements for permitted resales under
the Ontario Act has its analogue in Rule 144, which, unlike Rule 146 (defining "transactions ...not involving a public offering"), is not a "safe harbour."'192 Rule 144 differs from the Ontario provision in having a uniform
holding period.of two years from the date of acquisition. 9 3 It also differs in
having an additional requirement: compliance with resale quantity limits that
are based on a percentage of the outstanding securities9 4of the relevant class
and average weekly trading volumes in such securities.
The Ontario Act's post-transitional period resale rules represent a major
change from the 1966 Act's and the transitional period's controls. The degree
Returned to in the Part VIB of the text infra.
OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 5.20; Alboini, supra note 14, at
499-500. But see Johnston, supra note 52, at 232.
185 See The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71 (5), returned to in note
542, infra.
181, Cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 178 (two day "cooling off" period after mandated delivery of prospectus); and Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 438, 448, 458.
187 See Grover and Baillie, id. at 451; Johnston, id. at 232.
188 Emerson (1973), supra note 93, at 430-37.
189 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979); and see also 17 C.F.R. §230.237 (1979).
190 Text accompanying note 165, supra.
191 17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1979), "Preliminary Note to Rule 144." Its vires is
apparently not beyond doubt: see Loss et al., supra note 165, at 1535-36 (Loss).
192 Cheek, Exemptions under the Proposed Federal Securities Code (1977), 30
Vand. L. Rev. 355 [hereinafter Cheek] at 372.
193 17 C.F.R. §230.144(d)(1) (1979). The reason for the different Ontario position
appears to be the justifiability of making a series of concessions to "safer investments":
Alboini, supra note 14, at 497. And see also 17 C.F.R. §230.237 (1979) (five years).
194 17 C.F.R. §230.144(e) (1979). It is arguable that this additional requirement
is unnecessary against a background of continuous disclosure and a prohibition on
market grooming (in which some quantity limitations are instinct in any event: cf.
Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 438): see Sowards, Private Placements and
Secondary Transactions: The Wheat Report Proposals for Reform, [1970] Duke L.J.
515, at 521. Rule 144 was recently amended to remove the quantity limitations for
183
184
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of liquidity of securities acquired pursuant to exemptions covered by those

rules will in most cases be less, drastically so in the case of securities of nonreporting issuers. This of course was quite intentional; issuers are being
supplied with strong incentives to enter the Act's continuous disclosure
system.19a
However, there is a problem with the neatness of the closed system so
set up, with its deletion of "investment intent." This problem derives from
the underwriter extension of the definition of "distribution," which is in the
form that "the first trade in securities previously acquired under [inter alia,

the exemption covering a trade with an underwriter] other than a further
trade exempted by [subsection 71 (1)] is a distribution."" When the definition of "underwriter" is read with its "view to a distribution,"1 7 it is arguable
that a person who purchases under another exemption, to which a resale
extension of "distribution" applies, with a view to a resale outside any exemption and the applicable resale rules is an "underwriter." Any resale by

such a person outside the exemptions, even an otherwise permitted resale,

would then be a "distribution."'' 9 8 While there is no purposive language to
found an argument for a collusion with the issuer requirement, 9 a form of
investment intent requirement is plain.

It is at least arguable that the underwriter extension of the distribution
limb is unnecessary in a closed system to prevent the formation of public
sales by non-"affiliates" in certain circumstances: Wolfson, Comments on the Proposed
Federal Securities Code: Transformation of the Securities Act of 1933 (1979), 33 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1495 [hereinafter Wolfson (1979)] at 1509n. 55; and see 17 C.F.R.
§230.144(e)(2), 2nd sentence (1979). One advantage to quantity limitations over
"market grooming" controls alone is their greater ease of application by the regulators:
cf. Grover and Baillie, op. cit., 449-50. It should also be noted that the Ontario provisions, unlike the Rule 144 ones, do not require the use of a broker: see Grover and
Baillie, op. cit., 450-51; but see note 467 and accompanying text, infra. See further
text following note 568, infra.
195 Baillie (1980), supra note 15, at 3.
'90 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)11, concluding clause, when
read with s. 71(6) (from which the quotation comes) and s. 71(l)(r).
1071d., s. 1(1)43. In light of other provisions of the Act, particularly s. 24(l)(b)
(registration requirement), it is arguable that only purchasers of a substantial block of
securities are covered: cf. 1 Loss, supra note 31, at 642-43; but see the definition of
"distribution" in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)11, and compare
note 138 and accompanying text, supra.
198But see Beattie et al., supra note 146, at 131-32 (Boast) and Alboini, supra
note 14, at 487, who suggests that it is "likely" that the s. 71(l)(r) exemption is
restricted to registered underwriters, a view entertained about s. 71(1)(r)'s predecessor
under the former legislation: Dey (1972), supra note 106, at 152; but see also Emerson
(1979), supra note 92, at 236n. 106. Most purchases by an "underwriter" on the view
in the text would be qualifiable under The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s.
71(l)(d) ($98,000 purchases), to which the s. 71(4) permitted resale rules apply. But
compliance with those rules would not appear to meet s. 71(6)'s exclusionary conditions. Quaere if a resale after a purchase by an "underwriter" qualifiable under an
exemption covered by s. 71(5) which complied with the latter's permitted resale rules
would not be free of s. 71(6), by virtue of the form of s. 71(5)'s permission: cf.
Alboini, supra note 14, at 511-12.
199 Except for the "series of transactions" language in the concluding words of
The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)11, which are derived from the
former legislation, which is discussed in this aspect in note 195, supra.
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secondary markets for which there is inadequate disclosure. The extension
may be important to prevent the two-stage distribution through a conduit
that can proceed under a resale control without a holding period requirement. If so, it would at least make sense to require an element of collusion
between issuer and "underwriter," or at least a holding period "safe harbour." The 1978 Act does not require either of these. 200
C.

ProposedLegislation in the United States and Canada
The federal Proposals' Draft Act draws extensively on the existing
American federal scheme, the 1978 Ontario Act and the present American
scheme's proposed replacement, the ALI Code. In both what it does and
does not draw upon, the Draft Act contains some valuable lessons for provincial legislators.
Like the ALI Code and the 1978 Ontario Act in the post-transitional
period, the Draft Act has as its prospectus requirement trigger a "distribution," defined without reference to any provision for the purchaser to be a
member of the "public." 20 ' As in the ALI Code and the 1978 Act the Draft
Act's "distribution" focuses on new issues and a limited category of secondary market transactions. However, it differs significantly from its two major
sources.

The "new issue limb" of the Draft Act's definition requires "a sale by
or on behalf of the issuer of the security. '2 2 Like 203
the 1978 Act, but unlike
the ALI Code, there is an "underwriter" extension.
The Draft Act covers secondary market transactions in three separate
parts of the definition of "distribution." There is a part to cover
a sale of a previously issued security from the holdings of a person or prescribed
group of persons, if the aggregate holdings of securities of that class enable the
person or group to exercise a determinative influence over the management and
policies of the issuer in any manner.20 4 [Emphasis added.]

This derives from the 1978 Act's control person limb, with an attempt made
to sharpen the control language. 205' The body to be charged with the adminis20

o Two-stage distributions through a conduit without a holding period roadblock
are possible under The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(5): see Alboini,
supra note 14, at 497. However, on the argument in the text the "underwriter" extension would not 'apply unless a resale with market grooming were in view (see s. 71
(5) (c)). Compare the ALI Code position in the text accompanying note 203, infra.
See also 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 2.49 ("underwriter") and 2.17(b) ("distributions'" underwriter extension) discussed in the text accompanying notes 231-33, infra.
201 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
16-19. Compare 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, s.202(41) read with §202(110).
202 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.17(a). The concluding words of paragraph (a)
are omitted; these make it clear that the ground covered by The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)llii is also covered here. See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 17.
203 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17(b); compare 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra
note 6, §202(172) (A), Comment (1).
204 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17(c). This represents a rejection of a proposal
made in one of the Proposals' Background Papers to remove such an extension from
the prospectus triggering provision, a rejection which is not, however, explained in 2
Proposals,supra note 3: see note 225, inIra.
205 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 18-19.
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tration of the Draft Act, the Canadian Securities Commission (CSC), with
the approval of the Governor-in-Council is to make "regulations" to set out
the criteria for a control "group," allowing this concept to be sharpened as
well.2 0 6 Despite these two desirable changes, it seems that difficulties of interpretation remain. 2° 7 In that regard it is interesting to note that the ALI
Code has abandoned the 1933 Act's control person concept.
The ALI Code follows the Securities Act of 1933 in providing a new
issue disclosure trigger that, unlike the 1978 Ontario Act and the Draft Act,
does not separately deal with primary and secondary market transactions.
The ALI Code requires that before a person "in connection with a distribution" can sell, or confirm a sale, or deliver a security after sale or accept
payment for a security, an "offering statement" must be filed with respect to
that "distribution."20 8 "Distribution" is defined as, "an offering other than
(i) a limited offering or (ii) an offering by means of one or more trading
transactions." 20 9 The first exclusion 10 corresponds roughly with the "trans2 11
actions ... not involving a public offering" exemption in the 1933 Act.
The second, unlike the first, is at present confined to secondary market transactions not involving a security that is the subject of a "limited offering." It
must be put through a broker or dealer performing the usual function and
receiving no unusual compensation. The total of all trading transactions for
the seller during a "specified" period can not exceed whatever amount in
dollars, percentage of trading volume or percentage of outstanding securities
of the class that the SEC specifies by "rule. '212 If a secondary transaction is
not within either of these exclusions, it is caught, unless an exemption applies.
provisions
Control status, or the lack of it, is irrelevant. Three important
213
relieve against the hardship of this broad coverage, however.
The first, applicable only to an issuer which has been subject to the
Code's continuous disclosure system for at least a year (a "one year registrant") ,214 permits a holder of not more than fifteen percent of the voting securities of such an issuer freely to resell..2 15 In effect this erects a fifteen percent
206
See 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.17(c) read with s. 15.14(l)(a). On the CSC
generally, see id., Part 15.
207 "Determinative influence," while much sharper than The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)11 iii's "affect materially the control," is still not a bright line
concept. Compare 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.12.
208 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §504(a). See also §§502 and 503. "Offering
statement" is defined in §202(111) and is the equivalent under the Code of the "registration statement" under present legislation (see supra note 13): see 1 ALl Fed. Sec.

Code, §202(111), Comment. The definition of "distribution" is in the immediately
following text.
209 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41)(A). "Offering" is defined in
§202(110).
210 Elaborated upon in I ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41) (B).
211 See text following note 258, infra.
212 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41) (C). See text following note 575,
infra.
213 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §502(b), Comment (1) lists all the forms
of relief available.
214
Defined in 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(113).
215 Id., §512(4). Note, however, the exclusion in the subsection's concluding words.
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of lack of control, without the possibility of

rebuttal that exists in the 1978 Ontario Act's twenty percent control person
concept, but with the complication of a "control group" gloss. 217 However,
this conclusive presumption only applies to the "one-year registrant," a
further step towards integration that the 1978 Ontario Act and the Draft Act
may be reluctant to take 218 until further Canadian experience with continuous
disclosure warrants an appropriate exemption being created.
The second provision that relieves against the width of the "distribution" exemption for secondary transactions permits the holder of securities
(including a fifteen percent plus one) of a "one-year registrant" to elect to file

a "distribution statement"2 19 in place of an offering statement. 220 The "distribution statement" is a type of scaled down offering statement with its
required level of disclosure more appropriate to the
holder's station. 22' A
similar concept in the Draft Act is examined below. 222
The third relieving provision is designed for the secondary distributors
of the non-"one-year registrant," for whom neither of the preceding provisions will have any value. It confers on such persons the right, unless waived,
to demand that the issuer file an "offering statement. '223 The issuer must
then either file the statement or offer to buy the securities involved at fair
value. 224
This complex scheme appears to achieve the desirable result of eliminating the uncertainties endemic to the control person trigger while avoiding the
"overkill" of having all substantial secondary distributors subjected to a
prospectus disclosure requirement. 22 It might be responded that the ALI
2161d., §512(4), Comment (4)(a).

Id., §202(121 ) (B).
There are also some considerable reservations felt about it in the United States;
see id., §512(4), Comment (5).
219 Defined in id., §202(42).
220 Id., §510.
221 See Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code (1979), 33 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1431 [hereinafter Loss (1979)] at 1442.
222 Text accompanying notes 246 et seq., infra.
223 1 ALl Fed. See. Code, supra note 6, §512(b), a short discussion of which is in
Loss (1979), supra note 221, at 1443.
224 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §502(b)(5)(C). The filing on demand
provision is well analyzed in Wolfson (1979), supra note 194, at 1511-12.
225 See text accompanying notes 252 et seq., inira. For an alternative approach
which achieves the same result somewhat more simply, see Grover and Baillie, supra
note 11, at 416-17, 438-39, 462 (require prospectus only on primaty distributions, and
in case of "large secondary distributions," to be defined by rule; but have second requirement only if no serious adverse impact; eliminate requirement for prospectus for
control person trades; and leave CSC with discretion to require prospectus in cases of
heavy secondary market trading).
Regrettably, while 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.17(c) extension of "distribution"
witnesses the rejection of this proposal, no explanation of the rejection is proffered.
The same is also true of the apparent partial rejection (see note 581, infra) of the part
to do with heavy secondary market trading.
217
218
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Code scheme places a faith, not yet warranted in Canada, in the efficacy of
continuous disclosure. This is especially so in relation to resales of large
blocks of securities (with their accompanying selling pressures), which nonfifteen percent voting security holders appear to be free to resell without restriction. In conjunction with elimination of an "underwriter" extension of "distribution," this would appear to free formal underwritings from distribution
disclosure, which, in the light of the special selling efforts to be expected,
might give the regulators some concern.2 26 The matter of what relaxations in
the distribution
regime may be justified by continuous disclosure is returned
2 27
to below.
From the control person limb of the Draft Act's definition of "distribution" we move to its equivalent to the 1978 Ontario Act's controls on resales
by purchasers who took under an exemption. The Draft Act provision extends "distribution" to cover
a sale of a previously issued security purchased from an issuer or an underwriter
of the security, other than a security of a reporting issuer that was purchased by
the seller one hundred and eighty days, or such 2other
period as the [Canadian
28
Securities] Commission prescribes, before the sale.

In form this looks quite dissimilar to the 1978 Ontario Act's extensions
of distribution. In operation it is likely to be less restrictive, with the exception of prospectus qualified distributions of larger issuers.
Clearly, the immediate aftermarket in newly issued securities, whether
prospectus qualified or not, is to be restricted to the exemptions. 22 This is
accomplished because the "pursuant to an exemption," or like locutions, in
the 1978 Act's closed system "distribution" extensions2 30 is missing. Whether
purchasers after the first are caught in their resales will depend on whether
their seller was an "underwriter." "Underwriter" is defined (in material
part) as one who purchased "in furtherance of" a distribution.2 31 The language is derived from the ALI Code's "in aid of a distribution" in its definition of an "underwriter. ' 23 2 It is unclear what improvement on the "with a
view to" locution this represents; the language in the Draft Act, at least, still
focuses on the buyer's state of mind at purchase, although it may be argued

226

Quaere, if something like this underlies the reservations in I ALl Fed. Sec.

Code, supra note 6, §512(4), Comment (5).
227 See Part VI of the text, infra.
228 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17(b).
220 For holders of securities of "reporting issuers," the holding periods in s. 2.17(b)
are likely to be shorter than the provincial ones: see 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 17.
A "reporting issuer" is one subject to the Act's continuous disclosure scheme: see 1
Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.38. Not all the exemptions in the Draft Act discussed in
the next section of the text can on their terms apply to resales: see 1 Proposals, op. cit.,
s. 6.01(c), (d), (e), (g).
230 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(4),(5),(6), and (7), as am.
by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 9(2).
231 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.49, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
40-43.
2-32

1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(172) (A).
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that it requires a more dominant motive concerning a more immediate resale. 233 If this reading is correct, 2the
Draft Act's "closed system" is much less
"closed" than the Ontario Act's, 4 except where an underwriter is involved.
When23 - viewed in conjunction with the Draft Act's limited offering exemption, i and with its trading transaction one,23 6 the Act's exemption system
offers some significant outlets not available under the Ontario scheme.
The goal of preventing the formation of public markets for which inadequate disclosure is provided2 3 might be seen to be compromised by the
ambit of the Draft Act's exemptions. However, subjection to its continuous
disclosure scheme, and hence "reporting issuer" status, is to follow after listing on a "registered securities exchange" or attainment of at least 300 "public security holders. '238 The latter condition derives from the provision in the
ALI Code that stipulates the conditions in which an issuer must file the document that makes it a "registrant," and therefore subject to the Code's continuous disclosure scheme. 23 9 The condition dealing with the number of
security holders is not found in the Ontario legislation..2 40 However, distribution qualification under the Draft Act does not, of itself, entail subjection to
the legislation's continuous disclosure scheme, unlike the Ontario Act and
the ALI Code.2-4' The Draft Act takes the position, which the discussion in
this article of the material critical to the utility of mandated disclosure might
be read to support, that, in the absence of a significant spread of security
holders there will not be a sufficient "following" for an issuer to ensure that
the continuous disclosure file is used properly."4 - Hence, in its closed system's
coverage of a prospectus qualified distribution by a non-reporting issuer, the
233 Compare 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 42-43 with 93, 99-100 and 131. See also
SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F. 2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 819, 81
S. Ct. 52 (1960) referred to in 2 Proposals, op. cit., at 42n. 207; and Oxford, IV The
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961) at 619 ("furtherance").
It is arguable that a substantial purchase is required to qualify as an underwriter, in
the light of, inter alia, the registration requirement, inira: cf. I Loss, supra note 31,
at 642-43; but compare I Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17 with text accompanying note
138, supra. It is not clear that the reading in the text was the intention of the drafters
of the Draft Act: see 2 Proposals, op. cit., at 42-43 read with ALI Code, POD, supra
note 5, §299.74, Revised Comment (2) to which 2 Proposals refers.
234 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 93.
235 Text accompanying notes 258 et seq., infra.
-; Text accompanying notes 575 et seq., infra.
237 See text accompanying note 147, supra.
2:18 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 402(1); and see s. 402(2) (issuer not meeting
criteria may apply for reporting issuer status). See further the discussion of this section
in Part VIC of the text, infra.
239 The Draft Act provision makes some changes, however: see 2 Proposals, supra
note 3, at 66, and I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §402(a).
240 Compare The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)38.
241 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 67 and 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 4.02(1);
and see s. 4.02(2) (issuer not meeting criteria may apply for reporting issuer status).
242 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 67; and see 2 Proposals, op. cit., at 61-62, 64
(concern is with issuers of securities in which there are "active trading markets"); for
the material critical of the utility of mandated disclosure, see notes 39 and 40, supra;
and on the substance of the criticisms, see text accompanying notes 44-49, supra. Of
course, that text would strongly suggest that precisely where there is a following,
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Draft Act, with its exemption for resales by non-fifteen percent voting security
to "one-year registrants," is close to the Ontario and ALI
holders restricted
2 4
Code position.. :

But in its closed system's coverage of prospectus qualified distributions
of a "reporting issuer" it is on its face some distance from them. It may be
appropriate to confine immediate aftermarket trading to the widened exemptions until at least a sufficient following for the issuer has developed for the
issuer to merit becoming a reporting issuer, and perhaps not until the issuer
has had some experience as in the case of the ALI Code's "one year registrant.12 44 But, once the latter condition has been met, there seems to be no
reason for controlling resales through the distribution prohibition, even one
relieved by a trading transaction exemption, in the absence at least of a con5
trol relationship with the issuer, or a large volume resale. -4"
The matter of a large volume resale is encompassed by the final limb
of the Draft Act's definition of "distribution," which is likely to be the most
controversial. It makes a "distribution": "a sale of previously issued securities from the holdings of a sophisticated purchaser or prescribed group of
persons, if the aggregate number of securities exceeds an amount prescribed
by the [Canadian Securities] Commission. ' 246 This extension was included
"to invite discussion" of the application of special disclosure requirements
to "large sales by substantial investors."2 47 The rationale for such application
is closely related to that for control persons, but shorn of those related to
the preoccupation with control: the likelihood that special market grooming
efforts will be entailed in such resales..2 48 The special disclosure to be required will be significantly less onerous (as seems appropriate) than a prospectus, but, like a prospectus, will have to be delivered to investors.2 49 The
CSC's ability to vary the application of the extension by regulations specify"mandated disclosure" of any sort is unnecessary. But if there is to be such disclosure,
that text would suggest that reliance for investor protection on the filed disclosure
chacteristic of continued disclosure schemes over the delivered-to-investors form characteristics of new issue disclosure would be misplaced outside the cases where there is a
following.
243 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(4), discussed in. the text accompanying notes 215-18, supra.
244 See the discussion in the text following note 225, read with the text accompanying note 242, supra.
'145 Cf. Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 438-39, 448, (who would add "heavy
secondary trading"). The trading transaction exemption in s. 6.04, discussed in the text
following note 573, infra, could and probably would be tailored to avoid the problem
in the text. But it is submitted that it should not be necessary in the situation in the
text to qualify under an exemption: rather, the onus should be squarely placed on the
regulators to show that distribution regulation is appropriate for the reasons the text
suggests.
246 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 2.17(d).
2,47 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 19.
248 Id. Compare the given rationales for including resales by controlling persons as
events justifying prospectus regulation in the text accompanying note 131, supra.
249 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 5.05(1) and 5.04(1); 2 Proposals, supra note 3,
at 19. The relevant disclosure document will be called a "block distribution circular,"
thus differentiating it clearly from the prospectus: see 2 Proposals,op. cit., at 73.
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ing the triggering aggregate number of securities and "prescribed groups"
will further permit adjustments in the impact of the extension. 250 But, even
reduced to this degree, it goes beyond any corresponding provision in the
ALI Code, after account is taken of the Code's exemptions; at least this is so
in the Code's application to "one year registrants."25'
The cause for controversy is undoubtedly the concern expressed in the
Proposals about a negative impact upon institutional purchasers' willingness
to purchase securities.2 52 Their significance as a source of private placement
financing in Canada gives point to this concern.25 3 The problem seems to
have influenced the drafting of the ALL Code, which has dealt with the matter by the widely drafted exemption for secondary distributions by non-fifteen
percent voting security holders, but only of one-year registrants. 25 4 The
Draft Act did not adopt this provision, and the probable reason therefor
would seem to obtain here.2 55 However, one should also note that it seems
the SEC will be able, by rule, to cut back the scope of this exemption in
response to the type of investment protection concern expressed in the
25
Proposals.

0

The breadth of the definition of "distribution" in the Draft Act, as
under the 1978 Ontario Act, makes the exemptions even more important
than they were under the old "distribution to the public" rubrics. In the next
section, the matter of the exemptions under the new closed systems is reviewed. Here, the concern is with the replacements in the Draft Act for the
possibility of distribution, free of required disclosure, for non-"public"
distributions.
The Draft Act in this area borrows at least as extensively from the ALI
Code as it does from the 1978 Ontario Act. Like the latter, but unlike the
former, there is an isolated trade exemption that is worded similarly to the
Ontario provision and appears to share its interpretive difficulties. Like the
Ontario Act there is a limited offering exemption but it is structured after
the radically different ALI Code exception to the definition of a "distribution." There is also a separate "sophisticated purchaser" exemption that
somewhat confusingly draws more on the 1978 Act's limited offering exception than it does the Code. These last two exemptions deserve some
scrutiny.2 57
Cf. Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 462.
See 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41) and 512(4). But see also,
op. cit., s. 512(4), Comment (5).
250
251

252

2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 19.

253 Text
254

accompanying note 117, supra.
1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(4); but see also §512(4), Comment

(5).
255 See the text accompanying notes 225-27, supra.

2562 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1804(a) read with 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code,
§512(4), Comment (2) (s. 512(4) directed at "block trading" problem); but see also,
op. cit., s. 512(4), Comment (5) (reformulation of s. 512 would be desirable to avoid
its possibly excessive breadth).
2 57
See also the discussion of the trading transaction exemption in 1 Proposals,
supra note 3, s. 6.04 in the text accompanying notes 574 et seq., infra.
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The Draft Act's limited offering exemption is confined to a distribution
within a period prescribed by the CSC to not more than thirty-five "purchasers. '25 Like the ALI Code limited offering exception and unlike that of
the 1978 Ontario Act, there is no requirement for access to information, or
sophistication, or both, on the part of those "purchasers." As in the ALI Code
provision, the major limitation is on the number of "purchasers" that can result
from the original distribution and any resales by an original purchaser over
a stipulated period from the end of the original distribution.2 59 By contrast,
there is no special limitation on expansion of the original number of security
holders under the 1978 Ontario Act. Like the ALI Code and the 1978
Ontario Act, there is a further limitation on promotional activities in connection with the offering.2 6 Like the 1978 Ontario Act, but unlike the ALI
Code, there is a limitation on the number of offerees, because of the definitions of "sale" and "purchase" in the Draft Act.261 As in the 1978 Ontario
Act, but not the ALI Code, there is no express provision dealing with the
problem of whether other distributions made under other exemptions at about
the same time as a limited offering are to be integrated with the limited offering so as to limit its availability.26 2 Like the ALI Code, but unlike the 1978
Ontario Act, there is included in the exemption provision a CSC regulationmaking power to vary, in effect, the terms of the exemption-although the
2
power so conferred is broader than the SEC's under the ALI Code. 63
Finally, like the ALI Code, but unlike the 1978 Ontario Act, the
limited
264
offering is available to secondary distributors as well as to issuers.
Dealing with the last matter first, it seems likely that unless the CSC
makes relieving rules, compliance with the limitation on a spreading out
beyond thirty-five purchasers will be particularly hard for secondary distributors to ensure. "es5 Secondary distributors will, in any event, have at least
258 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.03, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
100-102. Note that "purchasers" and "sale" in the word "distribution" are defined to
include unconsummated offerings: see ss. 2.32 and 2.40, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra
note 3, at 27-28.The significance of this is returned to in the text accompanying notes

261, 270-71, infra.
259
20

This is discussed in the text accompanying notes 265-66, 273, inIra.
See I Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.03(2)(b); 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra

note 3; §503(b); and The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (p) (iii). The
Code prohibition is not a condition of the exemption, however, which seems in a sound
position in light of the sanctions for engaging in unqualified unexempt distributions
(see 1 Proposals, s. 13.02; Buckley, supra note 18, at 312-13); see 1 ALl Fed. Sec.

Code, §202(41), Comment (2)(a); but see Lang and Backman, supra note 164, at
1563n. 66.
26 1Supranote 258.
262

See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(110); and see §202(110), Com-

ment (1)(b). See Buckley, supra note 18, at 348, on the importance of the integration
concept in this area.
203

Compare 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.03(4) with 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code,

supra note 6, §202(41)(B)(iii) (restricted to non-"one-year registrants"). See the discussion of this power in the text accompanying notes 281-84, infra.
20 4 See, however, immediately following text.
205 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 101.
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the isolated trade and sophisticated purchaser exemptions to use up to the
limit."66
The Draft Act's condition requiring the initial distribution to be completed within a period prescribed by the CSC can be compared with that of
the 1978 Ontario Act's requiring six months2 67 and the lack of any such
condition in the ALI Code. The limitation may have been designed to reduce
the incidence of integration problems.2 6 8 It also appears to have the beneficial
effect of making it easier for the purchaser in a limited offering to determine
when the restrictive period must have expired ." The Draft Act's departure
from a fixed period for all issuers, as under the 1978 Ontario Act, seems
desirable in light of the different trading patterns between securities of seasoned and unseasoned issuers.
The Draft Act's abandonment of the access/sophistication criterion in
favour of a numbers test with spreading out controls and a prohibition on
promotional activities is the most distinctive feature of the exemption. They
will serve to confine most uses of the limited offering to transactions involving "a small number of associates who are not likely to require the protection
of part 5 even though they lack professional investment advice." 270 However, it may be asked why, with controls on promotional activities, it was felt
271
necessary to control the number of offerees as opposed to final purchasers.
The logic of the ALI Draft Code is persuasive: in such circumstances "it is
hard to see how an offeree is hurt." 2 7 The spreading out restriction borrowed from the ALI Code will create, in effect, a holding period without
even the possibility of resales pursuant to other exemptions, thereby reflecting the need to curb the peculiar potential for such a limited offering exemption to become a "broad public offering.12 7 3 The exemption will be of par"6 Discussed in the text accompanying notes 434-36 and 289 el seq., respectively,
infra.
•'67
The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(l) (p) (i).
268 The Commentary to the Draft Act does not discuss the point: 2 Proposals,supra
note 3, at 101.
269 This is a problem that was mentioned in connection with an earlier version of
the ALL Code provision and which the provision now appears to have largely overcome:
compare American Law Institute, Federal Securities Code, Tentative Draft No. 1
(Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1972), §227(b)(7) with 1 ALl Fed. Sec.
Code, supra note 6, §202(41) (B) (vii), and Lang and Backman, supra note 164, at 1568.
270o 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 100.
271 The explanation in 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 99 (solicitees rather than purchasers "determines the nature of the distribution") is not very satisfying, unless it is
expanded (and see 2 Proposals,supra note 3 at 28) following Cheek, supra note 192,
at 363. It may be possible to condition the market and mislead later purchasers without
falling foul of the special market grooming rules referred to. But it seems that the
better way to proceed would be via the power by regulation to vary the terms of the
exemption: see text accompanying notes 281-84, infra.
272 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41), Comment (2)(a); accord
Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 446.
273 Cf. Cheek, supra note 192, at 365 (source of quotation), which notes at
365n. 35, 366n. 37 and 375 that, while the ALI Code provision does permit resales past
the 35 person limit, this is provided that an exemption is available, and by virtue of
the Code's provisions in only the limited offering one and any created by SEC rule (see
1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §30) are candidates.
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ticular value to small issuers unable or unwilling to tap sophisticated or
institutional sources of funds, for which other exemptions exist. 274 In this
respect, the exemption can be taken not so much as an indication of where
investor protection is unnecessary because of "self-fending" 27 5. considerations,
shorn of the interpretive difficulties of the access/sophistication concept, but
rather as an acknowledgement that the cost of regulation is not justified by
the potential for harm to investors and may unnecessarily chill small enterprise.276 The circumscriptions of the Draft Act's exemption are thus essential to its acceptability in a scheme of regulation that emphasizes investor
2 77
protection.
A number of application difficulties arise with an exemption like this
which are probably best left to solution by regulation. Restrictive legends on
securities certificates and special procedures for securities transfer agents are
fairly obvious examples which occurred to the drafters of the ALI Code and
the Draft Act.2 78 The regulation-making power in the Draft Act provision is
not restricted to such topics, however.27 9 It extends to vary the period within
which the "spreading out" restriction applies; it is to be expected that the
ALI Code example of having a shorter period for "one-year registrants" will

274 Cf. Buckley, supra note 18, at 364 (who prefers the broader Code provision).
For those other exemptions, see text accompanying notes 404-12, infra. For a criticism
of the choice of 35 instead of a larger number of investors, based on the experience of
supra note 165, at
financing under the present American federal scheme, see Loss et al.,
1528 (Kripke).
275 This is a term employed by Cheek, supra note 192, e.g., at 364.
270 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 437-38; Buckley, supra note 18, at
316-22. This is not to deny the possibly greater potential for fraud in the case of small
at 321; and
enterprise: compare Cheek, supra note 192, at 364 with Buckley, op. cit.,
see notes 277, 281 and accompanying text, infra. But consider the importance of small
at 311; The Financial Post, April
businesses in the Canadian economy: Buckley, op. cit.,
5, 1980, s. l-s.10; and see recent initiatives by the SEC that would lighten the regulatory
burden on small issuers: Lang and Backman, supra note 164, at 1557n. 32; Williamson
(1978), supra note 15, at 63. It must be conceded that, from an investor protection
perspective, this position is easier for federal than provincial regulators to take: cf.
Cheek, op. cit.,
at 362n. 26. It is also easier to take if there are effective anti-fraud
at
controls in the statute: Cheek, op. cit., at 362n. 26; Lang and Backman, op. cit.,
1564-66; and compare I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, Parts XVI and XVII (esp.
§§1602(a)(1) read with 202(61) and (96) and 1703(a)) and I Proposals, supra note
3, Parts 12 and 13 (especially ss. 12.01 and 13.16(1) with The Securities Act, 1978,
S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 118 and Part XXII and Part 5d of the text, infra (generally more
expansive controls in the two federal schemes than in the provincial one). Overall, it is
hard to resist the force of the analysis of the Code provision of Wolfson, supra note
194, at 1504-506, concluding at 1506 that the reform was "without benefit of scientific
empirical studies" and it may be "unwise" to "freeze the new Code provisions in this
area based upon lawyers' hunches." For a response to this concern, see text following
note 637, infra.
277

278

Id.

Compare I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41)(B)(iv)(II) and (III)
with 1 Proposals, supra note 3 s. 6.03(4)(a) and (b) read with 2 Proposals, supra
note 3, at 102.
279 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s.6.03(4) (a); compare 1 ALl Fed.Sec. Code, supra
note 6, §202(41)(B)(iii) (non-"one-year registrants" only), which is returned to in
note 281 and accompanying text, infra.
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be followed. 280 More controversially, the general regulation-making power
for "establishing further conditions for a limited offering" could, for example,
enable the CSC to reintroduce self-fending criteria for limited offerings, as it
has been suggested the SEC acting under the corresponding provision in the
ALI Code could do. 281 The matter of delegated legislation is returned to
below. For now, it suffices to say that the operation of this novel provision
may suggest a need for further changes consistent with the broad policy of
the Act2l - and that the CSC should have the ability to make such changes
through the relatively prompt law-making mechanism of regulation. 283 There
appear to be sufficient constraints on abuse4 while preserving the desired
degree of flexibility built into the Draft Act .2
A related exemption to that for limited offerings excludes from the application of the Draft Act (except its enforcement part and the CSC's power
to deny exemptions) securities of an issuer other than a reporting issuer
"where the total number of security holders of the issuer, excluding employees, is less than fifty."' 285' This is the Draft Act's equivalent to the "private company" exemption in the 1978 Ontario Act..286 Its scope, wider than
that of the limited offering exemption, should be noted: there is no back-up,
subject to the CSC's power to deny exemptions, of the anti-fraud controls
in the Act.2 87 Given the much broader application of the limited offering
exemption, with its potential for greater investor harm, this seems appropriate..2 88
In turning to the Draft Act's access-sophisticated purchaser exemption, 289 one notes that there is no equivalent in the Code.2 90 The Draft Act

280 See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41) (B) (ii).
281 For concern expressed on this score in the United States, see Lang and Backman,

supra note 164, at 1562 and references in 1562n. 61.
282

1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 1.02 (especially efficient functioning of capital

markets and protection of investors), returned to in the text accompanying note 641,
infra.
283 See note 277, supra; but cf. Bialkin, The Issuer Registration and Distribution
Provisions of the Federal Securities Code (1977),

30 Vand. L. Rev. 327 [hereinafter

Bialkin) at 338.
2,84 See text following note 637, infra.
285

1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 3.01(e); and see the text following note 469, infra

on the selective operation on the rest of the Act of the distribution exemptions.
286

See text accompanying notes 446-47, infra.

28-

For the justifiability of such an application, ci. Lang and Backman, supra note

164, at 1564-66. See generally on the anti-fraud protections the text following note 494,
infra.
288 See note 278, supra.
189
Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.02(2).

•

The closest is the extension of the Code's limited offering exemption to include

"institutional investors," who are not to be counted as part of the 35 limit: see 1 ALl
Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41)(B)(i)(l); and §202(74) ("institutional in-

vestor"). See also under the present American federal scheme the SEC's Rule 242,
referred to in Lang and Backman, supra note 164, at 1557n. 32, and Chapman, supra
note 109, at II fn. 38 and text of that note.
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provision is patterned on two distinct provisions in the 1978 Ontario Act:
its "private placement" exemption for 97,000 dollar purchasers and its
"limited offering" exemption.2 1 The 97,000 dollar purchaser exemption is
discussed under the private placement exemptions described below. The part
patterned on the Ontario provision follows the parent provision sufficiently
closely so that separate comment is not necessary, except to note two points.
First, the Draft Act provision is not, unlike the 1978 Ontario Act one, a
"once-and-for-all" provision; this is probably a desirable change. 292 Second,
there is the special treatment accorded resales by sophisticated purchasers
under the Draft Act provision: if the resale is pursuant to the isolated trade
exemption, the purchaser is placed in the resale shoes of his vendor.29 3 This
prevents creation of a public aftermarket through the isolated trade exemption-but not through any other-without reliance on the "underwriter '2 94
definition. The reason for this special treatment of a combination of two
exemptions is not explained adequately in the Commentary to the Draft
Act.2 5 The reason appears to be similar to that warranting the "spreading
out" control on the limited offering exemption: the peculiar possibility for
the involvement
of persons not sensitive to the nuances of "underwriter"
6
status.2
While the 1978 Ontario Act's "limited offering" exemption was strongly
criticized for its retention of the interpretive uncertainties of the accesssophistication concept,2 91 7 such a criticism would be inappropriate for the
Draft Act provision. That provision does not, as under the Ontario Act, stand
only in company with another exemption, the isolated trade one, of perhaps
equally forbidding difficulty32 8 The Draft Act's limited offering exemption
relieves a great deal of the pressure that would otherwise bear on those two
difficult exemptions, particularly in view of the fact that the exemption is not
a "once-and-for-all" provision. In that context, the access-sophisticated purchaser exemption is likely to be relied upon in a much smaller category of
residual cases than its "public" forbear. The CSC could always, as the OSC
can, move to carve out sharper exemptions by regulationm9

291

The latter is discussed in the text following note 162, supra, the former in

the text accompanying notes 318 et seq., infra.
2 2

9 Alboini, supra note 14, at 477; Buckley, supra note 18, at 349.

293
294

1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.02(6).

See text accompanying notes 231-34 and note 233, supra.
295 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 100 indicates that it is to eliminate "the difficulties
of an 'investment intent'." This raises the questions of why here especially?
296 On that status see text accompanying notes 231-34, supra. In fact, the provision

in the text here may in one respect ease the position of a reseller of securities of a
reporting issuer, by giving him the benefit of his vendor's elapsed holding period. See
the wording of I Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.03(6), last 3 lines, read with s. 2.17(b);
see also 2 Proposals,supranote 3 at 100.
297 Text following note 174, supra.
298 See text accompanying notes 161, 162, supra.
-o9In Parts VB3 and C3 of the text, infra, where the power to create ad hoc
exemptions (see 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.01(1); The Securities Act, 1978, S.O.
1978, c. 47, s. 73 as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 10) is also referred to.
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Enough has been said of the main contours of the distribution regulation triggering provisions in the modern closed system to make plain the
importance of the network of exemptions those systems provide. The 1978
Ontario Act, the Draft Act and the ALl Code have a large number of exemptions in their respective networks. 3 "1 The details of those most basic to
their respective schemes are given above.3 ' Some of the other exemptions-30
particularly those commonly placed in the "private placement" category 2
-are in practical terms perhaps even more significant. However, there now
exists quite a substantial body of literature on the various exemption network30 3 and therefore this analysis will simply highlight what seems to be
important to the successful operation of a closed system.
Successful operation of a closed system requires a network of exemptions that is neither too restrictive nor too broad in terms of the regulatory
objectives. 30 4 The most obviously appropriate class of exemption is one that
sees adequate investor protection provided by other means; typically, the
investor can fend for himself, the risk of loss on the security is very low, or
there is adequate statutory protection elsewhere. 30 A less obvious and much
more amorphous class covers those cases where any investor protection good
to be achieved is outweighed by the cost of regulation.A06 The exemptions
here could run the gamut from those where the number or type of investors
involved does not warrant application of scarce administrative resources to
those where there is a serious question of chilling beneficial activity.30 7
:00 Respectively, The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 71(1), 72(1) and
73; and s. 139.20 (power to add to exemptions by regulation), as am. by S.O. 1979,
c. 86, ss. 9, 10; 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14, as am. by 0. Reg. 667/79, s. I and 0. Reg.
190/80, ss. 3 and 4; 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 3.01, 3.02(1), 3.03, 6.01, 6.02, 6.03,
6.04 and 6.05; and 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §§512 (read with s. 302), 514,
515, 303 and 304, and see also the "exceptions" to the Code's definition of "distribution"
in §202(41)(B) ("limited offerings") and (c) ("trading transactions") for exemptions
from the present American federal scheme, see the Securities Act of 1933, §§3 and 4,
15 U.S.C. §§77c and 77d (1976) and 15 U.S.C.A. §77c (1979). As virtually all of
these are carried forward into the Code, in one form or another, they will not be
separately discussed, except as seems appropriate.
: 1 Text accompanying notes 156-79, 258-99 and 209-24 respectively, supra.
:02 As to which see note 116 and accompanying text, supra.
303 The most useful for the present Ontario legislation are in Dey (1972), supra
note 106; Johnston, supra note 52; Emerson (1979), supra note 92; Iacobucci, "The
Definition of Security for Purposes [sic] of a Securities Act," in 3 Proposals,supra note
3, 221 [hereinafter lacobucci]; Grover and Baillie, supra note 11; and Alboini, supra
note 14. For the Draft Act provisions, see 2 Proposals,supra note 3; Grover and Baillie,
op. cit., and Connelly (1978), supra note 11. For the Code and the present American federal scheme, see Bialkin, supra note 283; Cheek, supra note 192; Loss (1979), supra note
221; Wolfson, supra note 194; Lang and Backman, supra note 164; Painter, supra note
9; and 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, "Introduction" and "Comments" (as applicable to relevant code sections).
304 See Grover and Baillie, id. at 409, 411.
305 See Iacobucci, supra note 303, at 261; cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 223.
306 See Iacobucci, id. at 261, who also proffers a further reason returned to in notes
326, 339, infra.
307 See Part V B2 of the text, infra.
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Especially in relation to the second main class of exemption, but also
in relation to the first, the rate of change in the capital markets, and the
imperfections in our knowledge of it, make residual provision for adaptation
appropriate, through the creation of new exemptions by the comparatively
expeditious regulation-making process.30 8 Those factors also make appropriate ad hoc exemptions, created by administrative decision on application for
particular situations. These ad hoc exemptions provide a more particularized
form of justice 309 and serve as a valuable source of information for the future
exercise of the regulation-making power. : 10
Finally, attention should be paid to the question whether any protection
other than the distribution regulation scheme should apply to the area covered
by an exemption. Simply because an investor does not need prospectus-type
protection does not necessarily mean that he does not need other protection-for example, that to be derived from having any securities professional
involved in the transaction meet minimum standards of probity, competence
and financial stability 31 ' What follows is a review of the basic architecture
of the exemption networks in the 1978 Ontario Act and the Draft Act, with
comparisons where appropriate with the ALI Code and existing American
federal law.
B.

Present Legislation: the 1978 Ontario Act

Exemptions Where Investor Protection is Seen to be Provided Elsewhere.
The pattern in the 1978 Ontario Act subdivides the specific exemptions312 into transactional and security types, the former relates to the characteristics of the transaction concerned, focusing on the disponee, the latter
relates to the characteristics of the security concerned. 313 The classification
scheme adopted in this article instead focuses on the rationales of the exemptions. Accordingly, both security-type and transaction-type exemptions are
discussed together where appropriate.
1.

There are in fact twenty-eight exemptions, eight of the security type and

308 On the rate of change in the capital markets, see Williamson (1978), supra note
15, at 75; on the imperfections in our knowledge of them see id. at 31-32, 56-63; and
on the justifiability of exemption by regulation-making see 2 Proposals, supra note 3,
at 56 and Loss (1979), supra note 221, at 1435-36. However, the American approach
to granting this sort of power has heretofor been much more cautious than the Canadian: see 1 Loss, supra note 31, at 605-39, IV Loss, supra note 137, at 2605-20; and
Garrett and Weaver, supra note 60, at 449-58. On the general issue of delegated legislative power, see Howard, "Securities Regulation: Structure and Process" (1978), in 3
Proposals,supra note 1, [hereinafter Howard] at 1662-65.
309 Cf. 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 56, 57.
310

See Alboini, supra note 14, at 525.

311 See Connelly (1978), supra note 11, at 1273; cf. 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at

50.
312 The terminology used for the ones fixed in the Act or the regulations: see, e.g.,
lacobucci, supra note 303, at 261.
313 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 71 (1) (as am. by S.O. 1979, c.
86, s. 9(1)) and 72(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d).
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twenty of the transaction type, that can be placed in the present category.3 14
Here we find in dollar terms probably the most important exemptions, the
three "private placement" ones. 15 The first exempts distributions to banks,
the Crown, municipalities, public boards, and insurance, loan and trust companies. 316 The second exempts distributions to institutions specifically recognized as exempt purchasers by the OSC. 1T The third exempts distributions
to institutions or individuals where the purchaser takes securities having an
aggregate acquisition cost of 97,000 dollars or more.318 A closely related
exemption covers distributions to vendors of assets of 100,000 dollars or
more.319 Also related is a security-type exemption for "'short-term' paper in
denominations of $50,000 or more."30 None of the first four is an exemption
eo nomine from the present American federal scheme's registration statement
requirement, although they have a fairly long history in Ontario's regulatory
scheme.3- However, under the American scheme much of their work is done
by the exemption for "transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering." 322 In the ALI Code there is an extension of the "limited offering" exception to the definition of a "distribution" for the benefit of transactions
with "institutional investors," sales to whom will not count for the purposes
of the initial count or the spreading-out limitation. 23 "Institutional investors"
are defined as banks, insurance companies and registered investment
com324
panies, to which list the SEC may add other institutions by rule.
The Ontario Act makes comparatively minor changes to previous legislation in the definition of the private placement exemptions. 25 One of them
:14 Classification by rationale is not (as will become apparent) an altogether "clean"
exercise: see Iacobucci, supra note 303, at 261. The count is based on the number of
discrete subparagraphs of the statutory and regulation provisions. It does not include the
two exemptions referred to in note 180, supra.
:.5 On usage here, see note 116, supra. On the exemptions' importance, see the
reference in note 117. supra.
:1 " The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71 (1 ) (a).
7
:U Id., s. 71(1)(c).
: 18 d., s. 71 (1) (d).
:I, d., s. 71 (1)(1).
:r, This is the characterization in Grover and Baillie, .upra note 11, at 414, of what

is now the exemption in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(l)(a) read
with s. 34(2)4.
321 They have all been in the Act since The Securities Amendment Act, 1971, S.O.
1971. c. 31, while that in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(a) has
been a prospectus exemption in one form or another since The Securities Act, 1945, 1945,
S.O. 9 Geo. VI, c. 22, s. 49(7)(a) read with s. 19(c), with one interruption (see S.O.
1947, c. 98. ss. 80 and 46 and S.O. 1948, c. 82. s. 9()).
:22 See text accompanying note 116, supra.
3123 See note 290, supra.
:24 See I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6. §202(74) and Cheek, supra note 192,
at 364.
325 See Alboini. supra note 14, at 433-35, 439-40, 440-52, 471, 516 with 276-77.
The major changes appear to be the dropping of the investment intent requirement
(after the transitional period) for the private placement exemptions (see text accompanying note 153, supra), the addition of "offering memorandum" rules for some of
them (see 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 7, substituting new s. 20 for 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 20) and
the change noted in the immediately following text.
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appears to represent a bowing to practice, in the extension of the 97,000
dollars purchaser exemption to individuals. This extension however sharpens
the question, which is most acute under this exemption, but which also arises
under the first of the private placement troika, of the extent to which investor
protection is being sacrificed to the facilitation of this type of financing.3 26
The possession of 97,000 dollars or more to invest is no guarantee of investment sophistication, let alone access to prospectus quality information or an
ability to absorb a loss. 32 7 This is a question returned to in discussion of the
Draft Act.
There could be added to the list of self-fending disponee exemptions:
328
(1) those for limited offerings (and trades among the original group)
and a closely related
exemption for distributions of "government incen329
tive securities";;
(2) trades with an underwriter; 330
331
(3) trades between registered dealers;
33 2
(4) trades with and between an issuer's promoters;
(5) trades with 3and
between an issuer's control persons and where the issuer
3
is acquiror; 1
334
(6) trades reasonably necessary to facilitate the organization of the issuer;
(7) trades in mortgages or other encumbrances upon realty or personalty if

offered for sale by a person registered under the Mortgage Brokers
Act;335 and

328 See Johnston, supra note 52, at 193, which at 192 suggests that a desire to avoid
constitutional confrontations may be behind some of those exemptions; see also lacobucci,
supra note 303, at 261.
327
See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 415-16, 446 and Re Shelter Corp.,
[1977] O.S.C.B. 6 at 14. But see also The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 124
and 139.21 (power to deny regulations, on an ad hoc or general basis) and 0. Reg.
190/80, s. 7, substituting new s. 20 for 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 20.
328 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(p), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 163-79, supra and 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 3(2) substituting new s. 14(e)
for 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14(e) as substituted by 0. Reg. 667/79, s. 1(2).
329 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 3(2) adding a new s. 14(g) and s. 4 adding a new s. 15(2)
(definition of "government incentive security") to 0. Reg. 478/79, discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 485-86.
330 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(l)(r), discussed in notes
196-99 and accompanying text, supra.
331 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(q), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 486-87.
332 0. Reg. 667/79, s. 1(1) substituting now s. 14(c) in 0. Reg. 478/79, discussed
in Buckley, supra note 18, at 329-30.
333

0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14(b).

The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(o), discussed in Buckley,
supra note 18, at 353-54 and Alboini, supra note 14, at 474-76.
335 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(l)(a) read with s. 34(2)5,
discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 516 and 277-79, who would put this in the 'low
risk of loss because otherwise regulated' class, below; but see Grover and Baillie, supra
note 11, at 414.
334
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(8) trades in securities evidencing indebtedness due under conditioned sale
contracts if such securities are not offered for sale to an individual. 3 "
The security-type exemption for "securities of a private company where they
are not offered for sale to the public" could also be included in this group. 337
But for reasons developed below33 8 it is perhaps better dealt with as a member of the "Cost-Benefit" class.
In a different subclass from the above exemptions are those premised on
the apparently low risk of loss associated with the security. As one would
expect, the exemptions here are of the security type:
(1) debt obligations of, or guaranteed by, any government (provincial,
federal or foreign or any political division thereof);
(2) debt obligations of, or guaranteed by, or secured by rates or taxes levied
by municipal corporations;
(3) debt obligations of, or guaranteed by, a number of the major international development banks, subject, in the case of some of them, to the
filing of any information or other material required by the OSC; and
(4) debt obligations of or guaranteed by banks, loan, trust or insurance
3 9a
companies.
Also to be included are the exemptions for put and call options written, or
guaranteed by, a member of a recognized exchange respecting listed securities and in a form prescribed under the Act;340 certificates or receipts of trust
342
companies for guaranteed investments; 34' variable insurance contracts;
and securities of a "mutual fund" administered by a registered trust company
and that exists to pool tax savings plans under the Income Tax Act.3 43
The low risk of loss presumably stems from the high level of govern344
ment involvement, whether directly or through regulation, in those issuers.
The difficulty with that criterion is that, in some cases, the investor may still
be running a considerable risk of loss. Mere government involvement does
336 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1 )(a) read with s. 34(2)6,
discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 516 and 279-80.
337 See the discussion of the predecessor of The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978,
c. 47, s. 72(l)(a), read with s. 34(2)10, in Johnston, supra note 52, at 225, 226.
'338 Text accompanying notes 369-74, infra.
'330 The Securities Act. 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(l) (a) read with s. 34(2)1 and
0. Reg. 478/79, s. 18, discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 515-16 and 272-5. An
additional reason for including at least some of these might have been to avoid constitutional confrontations: cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 192; lacobucci, supra note 303,
at 261.
:40 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(2) (c).
341 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1)(a) read with s. 34(2)2,
discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 516, 275.
342 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14(a), discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 522-23.
343 O. Reg. 190/80, s. 3(l) substituting new s. 14(d) for 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14(d).
344 Cf. Johnston, supra note 52, at 223-4. Quaere if this applies to the last exemption, however.

Prospectuses

1981]

not ensure
that information adequate for risk46 evaluation reaches the investor.345 This point is also returned to below.A
In a still different subclass are those exemptions where investor protection is already present rendering prospectus protection unnecessary. Here
we can place most readily the exemptions:
(1) for securities offered in a securities exchange
take-over bid covered by
347
the take-over bid scheme of regulation;
(2) for trades in securities exchanged in connection
with other statutorily
3 48
regulated forms of business combination;
(3) trades in rights issues and securities of a reporting issuer held by the
issuer and transferred pursuant to the exercise of a previously granted
call right, which are both exempt subject to compliance with OSC requirements, which are presently largely informational; 349 and
(4) distributions through the facilities
of a recognized stock exchange via a
"statement of material facts.1 350
The 1978 Ontario Act also exempts all securities exchanges involved in
exempt take-over bids.351 It may be argued that this is only appropriate to
the "private agreement" exemption where the offerees may be expected to have
the best informational position vis-a-vis the issuer. 35- Even then this will be
far from always the case. 353 A better way to handle the area covered by this
class of exempt take-over bid would be through the access/sophisticated
purchaser and limited offering types354of exemption in the Draft Act already
discussed. This is returned to below.
Also includable are some "issuer internal trades"; 355 that is, securities,
dividends or other distributions from earnings or surplus and securities distributed as incidental to a bona fide reorganization of the issuer.3 56 To these
could be added securities issued or transferred pursuant to the exercise of a
See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 411, 412.
accompanying note 418, infra.
347 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71C1)(), discussed in Alboini,
supra, note 14, at 468-69.
348 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(i), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 466-68; and see also Anisman, Takeover Bid Legislation in Canada
(Don Mills: CCH Canadian, 1974) [hereinafter Anisman (1974)] at 192, 195-96.
340 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (h) (i) and (ii) read with
the balance of (h) after (ii), discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 462-66.
350 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1)(b), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 517-21. Also includable within the present subcategory is the exemption in s. 72(1) (a), read with s. 34(2)8: see note 388, infra.
345

340 Text

351

The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (r), discussed in Alboini,

supra note 14, at 469-71.
352 See The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, s. 88(2) (c), as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86,
s. 12(1), and cf. Anisman (1974), supra note 348, at 194-96, 37-44.
353

Cf. 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 95, read with 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s.

7.19 (a) (i).
354

Text following note 429, infra.

355

See Johnston, supra note 52, at 203-207.

356 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (f) (i)and (ii) respectively,

discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 454-58.
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previously granted right to purchase, convert or exchange; 3r7 securities of a
reporting issuer held by an issuer and distributed as a dividend in specie;38
and equity securities issued pursuant to a plan available to holders of a class
of publicly traded securities of the issuer under which dividends or interest
can be taken as such equity securities.359
2.

Exemption Where the Cost of Investor Protection Outweighs The Benefit.
There are fourteen exemptions, seven of the transactional type and
seven of the security type, that can be placed in this category. 360 The most
obvious exemption is the isolated trade provision, where the amounts at stake
are not likely to justify the cost of regulation. 36 ' However, occasional large
distributions have been encountered here: 3 2 a "cleaner" exemption that
would also avoid interpretive difficulties is the "small offering" one contained
in both the present American federal scheme and the ALI Code. 30 3 A related
exemption, and one particularly suitable for legislation like the 1978 Ontario
Act which closely regulates secondary market trading, is the trading transaction exception to the
definition of "distribution" in the ALI Code on which
3
the Draft Act draws. 6
Also a de minimis exemption, but of greater significance, is the securitytype exemption for "securities of a private company where they are not
offered for sale to the public. '365 "Private company" is defined as Canadian
corporate law has defined it: in terms of a maximum number of security
holders exclusive of present or former employees, a charter prohibition on
offering its securities to the public, and a restriction on the right to transfer
its securities.3 66 Apart from the question of continuing to use a corporate law
36 7
concept that is perhaps outmoded for the purpose for which it is used,
there is the question of why "public" is not considered to make the exemption unnecessary, at least while the prospectus requirement has the "distri357 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71 (1)(f) (iii), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 459-60.
358 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (g), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 460-62.
359 0. Reg. 190/80 adding a new s. 14(f) to 0. Reg. 378/79.
360 Again, note the point made in note 314, supra: in particular, there is double
counting here to the extent of two trade transactions (see text accompanying note 377,
infra).
361 See discussion in the text accompanying notes 158-62, supra.
3 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 417. But cf. 2 Proposals, supra note
3, at 96-97.
363 Text following note 436, infra, and see also the power to cut back exemptions
in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 139.21. See also the (trading transaction) exemption discussed in the text accompanying notes 575-84, infra.
364
See I ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41 ) (c) and 1 Proposals, supra
note 3, s. 6.04.
365 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(l)(a) read with s. 34(2) 10;
see also 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 6 adding new s. 17a to 0. Reg. 478/79. The "de minitnis"
classification is from Buckley, supra note 18, at 322-326.
366 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)31. For a review of the other
Canadian legislation, see Chapman, supra note 109, at 11 12 to II 13.
367
Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 413.
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bution to the public" rubric. 3 8 Perhaps the answer lies in a desire to provide

reassurance to private companies. 3 9 If that were the case, the exemption
would be better placed in the category for exemptions where investor protection is provided elsewhere. But it is possible that "public" in the exemption
does not mean the same as "public" in the old-form prospectus requirement:
what caselaw there is appears to stress the "close friends or associates" test
over the "need to know" test,37 0 and the former seems more appropriate to
the notion of a private company than the latter. However the caselaw is
probably too sparse to provide certainty on the point.371 In any event, given
the uncertainties present, the nature of the issuer (particularly its likely in-

ability readily to afford expensive securities advice 37 2 ) and the apparent
significance of small enterprise to a successful modified free enterprise eco-

nomy,3 73

this exemption appears unjustifiably ill-adapted to such companies'

needs. 374 One can contrast in this connection the 1978 Ontario Act's exemption for a distribution of securities of a "private mutual fund,' '3 7 5 which has
no "public" qualifier for recruitment of members, and which can be seen
to anticipate the Draft Act's small issuer exemption.3 70 Also much better
adapted than the "private company" exemption are the
ALI Code's and the
377

Draft Act's limited offering provisions detailed above.

The exempted securities described under the heading of "issuer internal
trades" are also capable of being placed in this category. 378 In all these cases,
one cannot be assured that prospectus quality information is available at the
relevant time. This will be so even if the issuer is reporting,3 79 though in such
cases one would expect the discrepancy to be the smallest. 3 0 However, at
least some of the relevant transactions could be seen to serve useful functions

368 Alboini, supra note 14, at 288, whose suggested reconciliations are discussed in
the next note.
309 But see Alboini, id. at 288, which explains that the exemption focuses on offers,
not the completed transaction, and so sales to the public not accompanied by offers to
the public would be within the prohibition but also within the exemption. In light of
orthodox contract formation theory, this distinction seems impossible to maintain unless
a gloss is put on "offered" to confine it to general advertising or promotion, which
Alboini seems to favour.
370

See note 120, .supra.

371

Cf. Buckley, supra note 18, at 331.

372

Id. at 309n. 2.

See the references in note 276, supra.
Accord Buckley, supra note 18, at 342-43, 363.
375 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1) (a) read with s. 34(2)3 and
s. 1(1)32 ("private mutual fund"), discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 275, 17-21,
who notes that such funds are however subject to regulation elsewhere, in the "mutual
fund" sections of the Act: see ss. 106-17. Note the "public" element in one branch of
the definition: see s. 1(1)32i(a).
370 But see id. The "small issuer" exemption in I Proposals,supra note 3, s. 3.01 (e)
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 446, 447, infra.
377 Text accompanying notes 258-88, supra.
378 See text accompanying notes 355-60, supra.
370 See text accompanying notes 521 and 524-30, infra.
380 Hence the inclusion of The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1) (g)
in the previous category: see text accompanying note 358, supra.
373
374
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that would be seriously jeopardized by required subjection to the prospectus
scheme of regulation.3 81
Related to these issuer internal trades, but even farther from any question of previous acquaintance with the issuer's investment worth, is the
exemption for distributions to employees. "382 American caselaw on the
non-"public offering" exemptions distinguishes between employees with
and employees without a "need to know."383 The Ontario exemption opts
for removing
the new issue qualification impediment to employee stock
38 4
ownership.
There is a group of exemptions designed to facilitate the financing of
prospecting activities and the acquisition of mining claims for securities.3 81
All but one386 are subject to special requirements regarding the nature of the
arrangement under which the relevant activity is organized. In one case there
is a restriction on offering the securities for sale to the "public" and on selling the relevant securities to more than fifty persons or companies. 8s7 This
constitutes cogent evidence of the importance of mineral prospecting in
Ontario's economy. 88
There is also a group of exemptions covering securities of issuers organized exclusively for educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, religious or recreational purposes;;3 89 securities of corporations formed under
The Co-operative CorporationsAct, 1973;390 and shares issued by a credit
union within the meaning of The Credit Unions and Caisses PopulairesAct,
1976 . -' There is also an exemption to allow for the fact that the 1978
Act regulates some "commodity futures contracts" or "commodity futures
381 Seae Johnston, supra note 52, at 204 on the stock dividend exemption referred
to in the text accompanying note 356, supra; on the "reorganization" exemption there
referred to, cf. R. v. Santiago Mines, [1946] 3 W.W.R. 129 (B.C.C.A.), discussed in
Alboini, supra note 14, at 458; and note the change in the conversion exemption referred
to in the text accompanying note 357, supra, discussed in Alboini, op. cit., at 459.
382 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(n), discussed in Alboini, id.
at 473-74.
383

Alboini, id. at 373-74.

Johnston, supra note 52, at 203 (on predecessor legislation).
The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1) (a) read with s. 34(2)11,
12 and 13 (both read with Part XIII of the Act) and s. 71(1)(m), discussed in Alboini,
supra note 14, at 302, 339-46, 471-72.
386 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s.34(2) 11.
387 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 34(2)13.
388 See also Kalymon et al., Financing of the Junior Mining Company in Ontario
(Toronto: Ministry of Natural Resources, 1978), 2 vols.
389 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(1) (a) read with s. 34(2)7,
discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 517, 280-82.
D90
The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 72(l)(a) read with s. 34(2)8,
discussed in Alboini, id. at 516, 282-83, who would apparently treat this as an "otherwise regulated through disclosure" exemption (see text folowing note 346, supra); and
see Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 412n. 261. But see Johnston, supra note 52, at
224-25.
391 S.O. 1976 (2d Sess.), c. 62. The exemption is in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O.
1978, c. 47, s. 72(1)(a) read with s. 34(2)9, discussed in Alboini, id. at 516 and
283-84, who would appear to treat this as an "otherwise regulated so as to reduce
risk of loss" exemption (see text following note 338, supra); Johnston, id. at 225.
384
385

19811
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options"; distribution of those by a "hedger" through a dealer is covered.392
Finally, there are two exemptions tailored to the 1978 Act's coverage
of control persons and designed to avoid undue constraints on their liquidity
for dealings in the ordinary course of business. One of these covers the
common incident of loans to corporations with control blocks, the hypothe393
cation or other taking of security over the control block security holding.
The other permits394ordinary trading transactions in control block securities of
reporting issuers.
3.

Adding to, Subtracting From the Exemptions.
Mention has already been made of the desirability in a closed system,

of a regulatory power to add to the list of exemptions. This seems desirable
even in a closed system with as rich a pattern of exemptions as Ontario's.
Such a power in fact exists in the Ontario scheme. 395 Also desirable is a
power to allow for exceptional cases through an ad hoc exemption, that
allows the administrative agency a window on the working of the complex
set of exemptions. The OSC has that power as well, in a provision that has
396
recently been amended so as to amplify the power conferred.
A power to deny exemptions seems valuable to control abuse.3 97 The
OSC has that power also. 39 8 Further, as a result of the changes brought by
391
the 1978 legislation, regulations may be made to cut back distribution 9
392 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(s) read with s. 1(1)40
xvi, discussed in Alboini, id. at 489 and Ont., Report of the Interministerial Committee
on Commodity Futures Trading (Bray Report), (Toronto: Ministry of Consumer and
Commercial Relations, 1975) at 21-22, 82, 84.
399The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(1)(e), discussed in Alboini, id.
at 452-53, 508; and see Grover and Ross, Materials on Corporate Finance (Toronto:
De Boo, 1975) at 197-200.
394 The Securities Act, 1978, S.0. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(7), as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86,
s. 9(2) (which however does not come into force until the expiry of the transitional
period: see s. 143()), discussed in Alboini, id. at 505-12, 512-13; and see the discussion of the predecessor legislation in Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 416-17.
This exemption is returned to in the text accompanying notes 543-45, infra.
395 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 139.20; see also s. 72(l)(d), the
necessity for which is not apparent. This power was, under the preceding legislation
comparatively little exercised; but see now 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 14 as am. by 0. Reg. 667/79,
s. I and 0. Reg. 190/80, ss. 3 and 4.
396 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 73(I) as substituted by S.0. 1979, c.
86, s. 10. The change was to remedy the failure of the former s. 73 to allow the OSC to
make retroactive rulings; see also, s. 139.34, discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at 958-59,
which has not however been implemented to give the OSC exempting power in this area.
397 For an excellent discussion of uses of and problems with such a power, see
Baillie and Alboini, The National Sea Decision-Exploring the Parameters of Administrative Discretion (1978), 2 Can. Bus. L.J. 454; and see Alboini, id. at 843-50.
398 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 124.
390 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 139.21, discussed in Alboini, supra
note 14, at 957, which has been exercised in 0. Reg. 478/79, ss. 18-20, as am. by 0. Reg.
190/80, s. 7; quaere if this authority, or any other, warrants 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 17
substituted by 0. Reg. 667/79, s. 3. It appears to have been thought that, under the
Securities Act, S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 58(1), read with s. 147(o), sufficient authority
existed to modify at least some prospectus exemptions: Dey (1972), supra note 106,
at 147-48.
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exemptions. It is arguable that such a general power to pass regulations is
also desirable, provided that the regulation-making process affords those
interested an opportunity to intervene to present their views
and ensure the
40 0
agency pays attention to the adverse effect of regulation.
C.
1.

Proposed Legislation: The Draft Act
Exemptions Where Investor Protection May be Seen to be Provided
Otherwise.
The pattern of exemptions in the Draft Act, so far as it affects the
new issue regulation scheme, is very similar in structure (with its division
between transactional and security-type exemptions 40 1) and content to the
1978 Ontario scheme. It borrows extensively but not without modification,
from that scheme; it has also drawn on the Code's contributions in the area,
402including the limited offering exemption.
In the Draft Act there are twenty-four exemptions, six of the security
type and eighteen of the transactional type, that can be placed in the present
category if the limited offering one is included. 40 However, it is now plain
that this is probably a miscategorization of that exemption.
The private placement exemptions, for distributions to listed types of
institutional purchaser, 40 4 specially recognized exempt purchasers 405 and
97,000 dollar purchasers, 40 appear here as well as an exemption for "short
term" paper above a minimum denomination. 4 7 There is no separate exemption for a sale of securities for assets worth 100,000 dollars or more; it is
apparently to be covered by the 97,000 dollar purchaser exemption. 40 8 Comparatively minor changes are made to the Ontario precedent for institutional
investors and for "short term" paper. However, a major set of changes is
made for 97,000 dollar purchasers: they are subject to the numerical, offer-

400

See on this following notes 637, 642, infra.

401 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 3.01, 3.02 and 6.01-6.05.

402Text following note 258, supra.
403 This illustrates the difficulty of categorization that arises here as it did under
the Ontario legislation (see, e.g., note 390, supra); and see 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
92. The count here is not exactly comparable with the corresponding Ontario one,
since some exemptions which are separated in the Ontario legislation are united in the
Proposals and vice versa. But the count is a first approximation for the purposes of
comparison.
404 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.02(l)(a)-(c), (e), (f), discussed in 2 Proposals,
supra note 3, at 97-98. The inclusion of an exemption for distributions to "registered
securities advisers" in s. 6.02(d), which is not in the Ontario scheme, is justified in 2
Proposals,op. cit., at 98.
405 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.02(i) (g), discussed (by inclusion) in 2 Proposals,
supra note 3, at 97-98.
406 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.02(2), read with s. 6.02(3) (a), discussed in 2
Proposals,supra note 3, at 98-100.
407 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 3.01(a), discussed in 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at
47-48.
408
See I Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.02(3)(a) read with s. 2.32 ("purchase");
and cf. Alboini, supra note 14, at 442.
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ing mode, reporting and resale regulation of the access-sophisticated pur-

chasers exemption under the Draft Act.409 In terms of the investor protection difficulties with the 97,000 dollar purchaser exemption in the 1978
Ontario Act, these limitations make sense if the separate exemption is not
to be done away with completely. 410 Although some similar constraints were
also recommended for the institutional purchaser exemptions in a Draft Act
background paper,411 a sufficient distinction
between the two cases appears
412
to exist to justify the Draft Act's position.
It appears that the Draft Act's limited offering exemption 413 will do the
work of the 1978 Act's exemptions for trades with and between promoters
and control persons, and for trades with the issuer and organization trades
exemptions, since these do not separately appear. This is similar to the
apparent position under the ALI Code.414 There are exemptions for trades
to underwriters 415 and between registrants 416 similar to those in the 1978
Ontario Act. Finally there are modified versions of the Ontario legislation's
417 and
exemptions for mortgages or other encumbrances
for evidences of
418
indebtedness under conditional sale contracts.
Like the 1978 Ontario Act, the Draft Act has exemptions rated on the
low risk character of the relevant security; but unlike the 1978 Ontario Act,
greater attention is paid to the question of the adequacy of disclosure to
investors. Thus, virtually all the Ontario exemptions are to be found in
the Draft Act in some form. 419 Particularly noteworthy for their deletion 420
4 The access-sophisticated purchaser exemption is discussed in the text accom-

panying notes 289-96, supra.
410
See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 98.
411 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 439.
412 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 97-98.
413 Text following note 258, supra. Both that exemption and the access-sophisticated
purchaser one (see text accompanying notes 289-96, supra) could cover much of the
ground represented by the "government incentive security" exemption in the text accompanying note 329, supra.
414 Cf. Painter, supra note 9, at 13 et seq. (limited offering transaction exemption
replaces non-public offering one).
415 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.01(b), discussed in 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at

93.

410 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.01(a), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 93. See also the "registered adviser" exemption referred to in note 404, supra.
417 1 Proposals,id., s. 3.01 (d), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 48-49.
418 1 Proposals,id., s. 3.01 (b), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 48.
419 1 Proposals,id., s. 3.02(a)-(d). See also s. 3.01(c), discussed in 2 Proposals,id.
at 49.
420 Also deleted is the trust company guaranteed investment certificate exemption
(see text accompanying note 341, supra); and the variable insurance contract exemption
(text accompanying note 342, supra); but see 1 Proposals,id., s. 3.02(c) (in effect, exemption available if adequate disclosure available aliunde) and Grover and Baillie, supra
note 11, at 412, which would indicate that this is a better way to handle the exemption.
The other deletion is the put and call options one (see text accompanying note 338 supra),
which is expected to be dealt with by regulation: see 2 Proposals,id. at 55-56; and see
Grover and Baillie, supranote 11, at 418.
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are securities of foreign governments; 42 1 these have traditionally been the
subject of disclosure requirements in the United States, a position the ALI
Code will not change. 422 Also, securities of banks and other financial institutions, including a number not included in the Ontario legislation, are
exempt subject to the condition that they are regulated by a federal or
provincial government agency, "that requires substantially similar disclosure
by the institution in connection with a distribution and on a continuing basis
to that required of an issuer under this Act. '423 There is also a useful provision that permits the CSC to relieve the interpretive uncertainty engendered
by this through "[ad hoc] order"
or "regulation" specifying an Act as re42 4
quiring this level of disclosure.
The Draft Act also has exemptions for situations where disclosure is
already compelled for investor protection which parallel those in the 1978
Ontario Act. Thus, there are exemptions for securities exchange take-over
bids 425 and other statutorily regulated forms of business combination,4 2 and
the information-contingent rights issue exemption. 42 7 There is also a Draft
Act exemption that deals with distributions through the facilities of a stock
exchange via a statement of material facts. 42 8 The exemptions grouped under
"issuer internal trades" in this category for the Ontario Act are returned to
429
below.
The Draft Act does not allow an exemption for exempt take-over bids,
as the 1978 Ontario Act does, for sound reasons. 430 Much of the ground
covered by the exempt take-over bids will in any event be covered by the
limited offering and access/sophisticated
purchaser exemptions 431 and the
432
trading transaction exemption.
2.

Exemptions Where the Cost of Protection May be Seen to Outweigh the
Benefits.
There are nine exemptions, six of the transactional type and three of
421

2 Proposals,id. at 51.

4=2 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 411.
4"3 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 3.02(1)(c) concluding words, discussed in 2

Proposals,supra note 3, at 52-53.
424 1 Proposals,id., s. 3.02(3), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 52. See also I Proposals,
ss. 2.27 ("order") and 2.37 ("regulation").
425 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.01 (f), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 94-95.
426 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.01 (e), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 94-95.
427 1 Proposals, id., s. 6.01(d), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 94. The exemptions
for conversion into securities of a reporting issuer's own issue in the corresponding Ontario
provision (see text accompanying note 349, supra) is apparently covered in I Proposals,
s. 6.01 (c) (iii), which is returned to in note 449, infra.
428 1 Proposals, id., s. 5.14, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 88-89.
420 See note 449 and accompanying text, infra.
4:30 See text accompanying notes 351-54, supra and 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
95.
431 See text accompanying notes 258-84 and 289-99, respectively, supra, a position
which seems justifiable for the reasons given in the text accompanying notes 351-53,
supra.
432 See text accompanying notes 575-84, infra.
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433
the security type that under the Draft Act can be placed in this category.
434
There is an isolated trade transaction exemption
that parallels the 1978
Ontario Act. 435 Although no quantity limits are placed on the transaction
under the exemption, the CSC has a regulation-making power similar to that
of the OSC that would enable it to cut back the exemptions' scope if it
seemed appropriate. 436 There is no small offering exemption here of the type
in the ALI Code and the present American federal scheme, which exempts
offerings up to 100,000 dollars.437 The exemption in those instances is seen
to serve a valuable function by supplementing the limited offering and the
local distribution exemptions so as to facilitate the raising of equity by small
business. 43 8 The SEC has a power to modify or withdraw the exemption in
cases of offerings no smaller than 50,000 dollars.439 The Draft Act appears
to reject this exemption on the basis expressed in one of its background
papers:440 that the matter is better dealt with through an adjustment in the
burden of prospectus disclosure. 441 Such is the practice under the American
442
federal scheme for so-called Regulation A offerings up to 500,000 dollars.
While no special provision is made for these in the ALI Code, it is anticipated
that they will be covered by SEC regulation under the Code. 443 The fact that
there is a distinct exemption for offerings of less than 100,000 dollars sug444
gests that a better reason for non-inclusion should have been forthcoming.
In light of the co-existence with the Draft Act of residual provincial protection and the presence in the Draft Act of substantial anti-fraud provisions
445
the Draft Act position is even harder to understand.

There is a further de minimis exemption in the Draft Act that corresponds to the 1978 Ontario Act's "private company" provision though it
is shorn of its difficulties for small companies. 446 This is the exemption for
433 Again, the categorization is not altogether "clean"; see, e.g., the text accompanying note 452, infra and the reference in notes 390, 391, supra. With respect to the
comparability of this "count" with the same one under the 1978 Ontario Act, see note
403, supra.
434 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.01(h), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
96-97, where the problem raised in the text accompanying note 362, supra, is addressed.
435 Text accompanying notes 159-62, supra.
436 See text accompanying note 461, infra; but see also 2 Proposals, supra note 3,
at 96-97 (which might suggest an interpretive escape).
437 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(5), discussed in Cheek, supra note
192, at 398-99 (referring to 17 C.F.R. §230.240 (1979)).

See Cheek, id.
1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(5)(ii), discussed in §512(5), Comment (1)(d).
440 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 453.
441 Or through exemption by regulation: cfi. 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 97.
442
2 See Cheek, supra note 192, at 398 and 17 C.F.R. §230.254(a)(i) (1979).
443 ld. at 399; Painter, supra note 9, at 31.
444 Cf. 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(5). Comment (1)(d).
445 Cf. Cheek, supra note 192, at 399. The matter of residual protections is returned to in section 5d of the text, infra. The existence of the provincial control factor
would militate against the adoption of the exemption at the provincial level, of course.
446 See for those difficulties text following note 366, supra.
438
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trading in securities of an issuer other than a reporting issuer with less than
fifty security holders, including employees. 447 Perhaps the limited offering
exemption, discussed above, 448 is best suited to this category as well.
The Draft Act also exempts most of the types of issuer internal trades
that the 1978 Ontario Act does, with generally little change from the Ontario
449
model.
The Draft Act, as does the 1978 Ontario Act, exempts distributions to
an issuer's employees while usefully 4adding a limitation on sales pressures
in connection with such distributions. 1"
The Draft Act also exempts, as the 1978 Ontario Act does, distributions
of securities of issuers organized exclusively for educational, benevolent,
451 and equity securifraternal, charitable, religious or recreational purposes;452
ties of co-operative corporations, and of credit unions .
The Draft Act allows for ordinary course resales by control persons of
reporting issuers under its trading transaction exemption. 4 3 It appears to
allow for giving security over control block securities through its isolated
trade, limited offering or institutional purchaser exemption although the
omission of the 1978
Act's explicit "control block" exemption is not ade45 4
quately explained.
Also omitted from the Draft Act are hedgers' sales through dealers of
commodities options and commodities futures contracts, and the prospecting
and mineral claim exemptions in the 1978 Ontario Act. The reason for omitting the latter is the presumption that most "genuinely entitled" to the exemption will be covered by the local distribution exemption returned to
below; 455 to the extent they are not, they will feel the full weight of the
447 1

Proposals, supra note 3, s. 3.01 (e), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at

49-50, which justifies it on the basis that issuers here are likely "to be local in relation
to the securities market" and not to require federal regulation. This appears to be the
only point in relation to the exemptions where there is a suggestion of reliance on
provincial securities laws; and "reliance" may put the matter too strongly: contrast
Cheek, supra note 192, at 362n. 26; but see Buckley, supra note 18, at 365.
448 Text accompanying notes 258-84, supra.
4411
See 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.01 (c), discussed in 2 Proposals,supra note 3,

at 93-94. Despite the "Sources" note to s. 6.01, there does not appear to be an equivalent to the Ontario exemption described in the text accompanying note 358, supra. The
exemption described in the text accompanying note 359, supra is also not reproduced
(although it probably post-dated the Proposals): quaere if I Proposals, s. 6.01(c) (iii)

does its work.
4511 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.01 (g), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 95-96.

1 Proposals,id., s. 3.02(1)(e), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 54.
Proposals,id., s. 3.02(l )(f), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 54-55, which explains why the exemption is confined to equity securities.
4.,1

452 1

4Z3

Discussed in the text following note 573, infra.

454 Grover and Baillie, supra note 1I,
at 454 do not discuss it in detail because they

eliminate "control-block" distribution in their proposed scheme of regulation. But see 2
Proposals,supra note 3, at 97 (use of exemption-by-regulation power)

and 140.

4-,5 2 Proposals,id. at 55. The "local distribution" exemption is returned to in the text
accompanying notes 622-28, infra.
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statute, relieved perhaps by regulations specially tailoring the disclosure requirements to them.45 This seems an appropriate position. The former
omission is apparently intended not to suggest the coverage of the hedger's
transaction, but rather to leave the matter to a determination whether the
instrument as so traded was a "security. '45 7 Only if it has the necessary
be caught, in which case an exempinvestment character will the transaction
45 8
tion by regulation may be appropriate.
Adding to, Subtracting from the Exemptions.
As in the 1978 Ontario scheme there is conferred on the CSC a power
by regulation to add to the exemptions and by decision to create ad hoc
ones. 459 In regard to the latter power here is a useful reminder to -the CSC
to consider whether the "cost460of providing a prospectus outweighs the resulting protection to investors."
3.

As in the 1978 Ontario scheme, there is a power to deny an exemption
by decision or by regulation. 46 1 The latter power is subject to a number of
controls unique to the Draft Act. 4" In addition, a number of the exemptions,
including in particular the limited offering one, 46 3 have built into them a
power to vary their terms by regulation, which is subject to the controls.
These powers appear to be useful adjuncts to administrative control in this
area.
D.

Residual Protection:Present and ProposedLegislation

The 1978 Ontario Act draws heavily on its predecessor statutes in its
attitude towards residual investor protection where an exemption applies.
For the most part, transactions that fit within the exemptions scheme above
are considered to merit no other form of protection than the Act's miscellaneous trading controls and the supervisory powers vested in the OSC.464
It is true that some of the exemptions are conditioned on alternative disclosure and sometimes civil liability cover being provided.40 5 However, most
450 See 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 5.05 and 15.14(1)(a); and cfi. Grover and

Baillie, supra note 11, at 413-14.
457 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 36.
458 Cf. 2 Proposals,id. at 97 and references in note 392, supra.

459 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 3.03 (general power: by "order" and "regulation") and 6.01(a) (distributions: by "order"), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 56-57, 97.
460 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.01 (i), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 97.
1 Proposals,id., s. 3.04, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 57-58.
462 See text following note 637, infra.
403 See note 281 and accompanying text, supra. See also text accompanying note
401

577, infra.
404 See The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, Part XII (trading rules: most
are confined to situations involving registered persons, on the involvement of which here
see note 467 and accompanying text, infra); and ss. 122-24 (OSC supervisory powers).
See also s. 139.21 (denial of exemptions by regulation) and Part VI (Investigations).
465 See, e.g., The Ontario Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 71(1)(h)
(alternative disclosure: see text accompanying note 349, supra) and 71(1)(d) read
with 0. Reg. 190/80, s. 7 substituting new s. 20 for 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 20 (civil liability
cover).
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of them are also, for the most part with few changes, exemptions from the
other main scheme of regulation in the 1978 Ontario Act: the trader licensing requirement. 466 The effect of this is not to compel the involvement of a
registrant licensed by the OSC, which is required in the case of transactions
without matching prospectus and licensing exemptions. 4 7 The involvement
of an OSC-licensed professional, even if as agent for the seller, is seen to
serve valuable investor protection purposes. Those purposes are that securities market professionals are honest, competent and financially stable, so as
to reduce investor losses through market manipulation, inappropriate investments and loss of funds or securities on deposit with a professional. 8 As
a practical matter, however, given the wide coverage of the securities industry
by the 1978 Act, involvement of a registrant40in some, but not all, trading
covered by the exemptions is to be expected. 6
The Draft Act takes a quite different and much sounder approach overall to the question of residual protection. There is what amounts to an
acknowledgement in the exemptions that the reasons that activate the prospectus requirement and its scheme of exemptions will not always coincide
with the reasons for requiring the licensing of securities market professionals.
The Draft Act follows the present American federal Act 470 and the ALI
Code471 in only requiring those who carry on a business of trading (instead
of trading simpliciter as under the 1978 Ontario Act 472 ), to register, with
the exception of a licensing requirement for those who "act as an underwriter. ' 473 For this confinement in the scope of the licensing requirement
there is a much reduced network of exemptions, reflecting the recommenda474
tions of the background paper on licensing prepared for the Proposals.
The federal and provincial governments, municipal corporations and public
boards are exempt from the new licensing requirement.4 7 5 So are those whose
business or underwriting is confined to:
47
(1) "short term" minimum denomination paper; 1
400 See Alboini, supra note 14, at 430-32.
467 This compulsion comes about from the width of the licensing requirement ill

The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 24 read with s. 1(1)42 ("trade") (see
Connelly (1978), supra note 11, at 1276-78) and the licensing-only exemption in s.
34(1)10 (trading through a registrant) (see Alboini, id. at 264-65).
46S Connelly (1978), id. at 1273-74.
469 Cf. Re PartXV of the B'y-Laws of The Toronto Stock Exchange, [1976] O.S.C.B.
289 at 307-11 (diversified character of business of TSE member firms).
470 The Securities Act of 1934, §15(a), 15 U.S.C. §78o (1976) and 15 U.S.C.A.
§78o (1979).
471 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, Yupra note 6, §702(a).
472

See note 467, supra.

473 The business must be interprovincial: see I Proposals,supra note 3, s. 8.07. On

the "underwriter," see I Proposals, s. 8.01(1), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3,
at 131, which is partly contradicted at 41. For the meaning of "underwriter," seo text
accompanying notes 231-33 and of note 233, supra.
474 Connelly (1978), supra note 11, at 1278 et seq. and see 2 Proposals,id. at 138.
475 1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06() (a)-(c), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 139.
476 1 Proposals,id., s. 8.06(2) (a) read with s. 3.01 (a), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.
at 139.
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(2) mercantile or consumer transaction paper; 477
(3) receipts or trust certificates issued by certain deposit-taking institutions; 478
on realty or personality; 479
(4) certain mortgages or other encumbrances
480
(5) securities issued by a mutual fund;
(6) sales to institutional purchasers; 48' and
482
(7) sales for a secured creditor realizing on his collateral.
There are exemptions for:
(1) carrying on business as a broker483 or dealer, 48 4 but not for acting as an
underwriter;
(2) trading by official parties485such as executors, authorized trustees in
bankruptcy and receivers;
company's execution of unsolicited orders through a
(3) a bank's or 4trust
"registrant"; 16
(4) a trade for its own account or an account held in trust by it by a bank,
insurance, trust487or loan corporation, a mutual fund or any other financial institution;
(5) trading by488a person for his own account solely with or through a
registrant.
Also there is an exemption from the requirement to register for carrying on
a business as an adviser in certain circumstances which parallels the matching
adviser exemptions in the 1978 Ontario Act. 48 9 The resulting coverage of
the licensing requirement will ensure a greater likelihood than under the
1978 Ontario Act that a registrant will be involved in a transaction exempt
where this seems appropriate
from distribution regulation in circumstances
490
in light of the objectives of licensing.
Of greater significance than the involvement of a licensee as residual
protection in disclosure exempt transactions under the present American
477

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (a) read with s. 3.01 (b), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.

at 139.
478 1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (a) read with s. 3.01(c), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.

at 139.
479

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (a) read with s. 3.01(d), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.

at 139.
480

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (b) read with s. 2.25 ("mutual fund"), discussed in 2

Proposals, id. at 140.
481 1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (c) read with s. 6.02(1 ), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.
at 140.
482
483

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (d), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 140.
Defined in 1 Proposals, id., s. 2.07.

485

Defined in I Proposals, id., s. 2.14.
1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(3) (a), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 140.

486

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(3)(b), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 140. "Registrant"

484

is defined in 1 Proposals, s. 2.35.
487

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(2) (c), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 140-41.

488

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(3) (d), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 141.

489
4 90

1279-92.

1 Proposals, id., s. 8.06(4)(a)-(c), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 141-42.

See 2 Proposals, id. at 138-42 and Connelly (1978), supra note 11, at 1273-74,
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federal scheme and under the ALl Code is the scheme of anti-fraud protections in the American legislation.4 91 The protections consist of a network of
provisions that prohibits manipulation and deception in connection with
securities trading giving rise to the possibility of criminal, administrative and
civil sanctions. 492 These prohibitions are seen to go considerably beyond
what common law protections exist in the area.40 3 Generally speaking, they
have no equivalents in the residual protection area presently relevant in the
1978 Ontario Act. What protection there is largely derives from
the Criminal
43 4
Code, OSC administrative proceedings and the common law.
As with the treatment of licensing, the Draft Act on this point appears
to draw more on the American example than does the 1978 Ontario Act. In
particular, a broad prohibition in the Draft Act on engaging in deception or
misrepresentation41a33 appears to partake more of the SEC's rule 1Ob-5 491,
prohibition to a similar effect made under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and that prohibition's ALI Code derivative, 40 7 than of the 1978 Ontario Act or Criminal Code provisions which cover some of the same
ground. 495 Also, there is a specific power vested in the CSC to make regulations defining and prohibiting manipulation in connection with a distribution499 which owes much to rule 1Ob-5's parent provision in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934."H3 Backing up these provisions and others in the
"Fraud and Manipulation" Part (12) of the Draft Act are investigative 01
powers and the possibility of administrativer0 2- as well as criminal 0 3 sanctions. Finally, there is a much more extensive network of express statutory
491 See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaning-

ful Formula? (1967), 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 367 [hereinafter Coffey] at 371 (present
scheme); Cheek, supra note 192, at 356-57 and Painter, supra note 9, at II (Code).
492 See Coffey, id. at 371 (present law); I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, at
xliii-lv, and 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, Parts XVI-XVII[ (Code and present
law).

43: See Coffey, id.; I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, id. at xlvi-liii.
494 See on the Criminal Code, Leigh, "Securities Regulation: Problems in Relation
to Sanctions" (1978), in 3 Proposals, supra note I, [hereinafter Leigh] at 514-31; on
the OSC's major supervisory powers, Johnston, supra note 52, at 358-60 and Alboini,
supra note 14, at 824-50. The major common law protections appear to be the fiduciary
duties (see, e.g., Laskin v. Bache, [1972] 2 O.R. 465, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.); and
negligent (and fraudulent) mis-statement (see, e.g., Culling v. Sansai Securities (1974),
45 D.L.R. (3d) 456, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 686 (B.C.S.C.)).
4513
1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 12.01, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
216-18.
4133;17 C.F.R. §240.10 b-5 (1979).
49372 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1602(a).
4
9h See the references in I Proposals, supra note 3, s. 12.01, "Sources."
499 1 Proposals. supra note 3,s. 12.11 (a), discussed in 2 Proposals, stupra note 3, at
233.
,a1The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1976).
311 1 Proposals, supra note 3, ss. 14.01-14.03, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note

3, at 303-10.
54321 Proposals, id., ss. 14.04, 14.05, and 3.04. discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 311-14,

314-17. 57-58, respectively.
.:31 ! Proposals, id., ss. 14.10, 14.11, discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 325-28.
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civil liability rules, 0 4 including one of great interest in connection with the
anti-fraud prohibitions. This is a provision in the Draft Act, "057 following one
in the ALI Code," ° that in turn draws on experience under the present
American federal scheme

°7

The provision encourages courts to take a more

expansive attitude toward implying civil liability for breaches of the statute,
regulations or by-laws of self-regulatory organizations than they have tradi-

tionally done.50 8 This is of particular interest in light of the significance that
implied civil liability of that sort has come to assume in the United States. 5°0

A final item of residual protection referred to in the United States 51 'but not generally speaking in the Commentary or background material to
the Draft Act's exemptions51"-is that deriving from the application of state

securities laws, to fill in gaps in federal coverage. This is particularly men51 2
tioned in conjunction with the ALI Code's limited offering exemption.3
51
it
While the purpose and operation of that exemption are commendable,
may be argued that the continued application of state (or provincial) law
could seriously impair its value. 514 Generally speaking, none of these Draft

Act exemptions seems dependent on co-existing broader provincial regulation. 51 5- The matter of co-existence of the proposed federal with the provincial schemes is returned to below. 51"

VI. THE IMPACT OF CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE ON PROSPECTUS
DISCLOSURE
A.

Introduction

The upgrading of continuous disclosure requirements in securities regulation in both the United States and Canada "17 raises the question of the
504

1 Proposals,id., Part 13; and see 2 Proposals,id. at 235-38.

505 1 Proposals,id., s. 13.16, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 272-77.
500 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1722(a).
507

See 2 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1722(a), Comment (1)-(3).

08 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 273, 274 and Leigh, supra 494, at 553-61.
509 See, e.g., Jennings and Marsh, supra note 7, c. 17. This does not suggest, and

the Proposals do not suggest, that such civil liability will assume the same significance
in Canada: our courts may be expected to be more conservative in their use of the
Draft Act power than American Courts in their use of the ALL Code one.
510 See, e.g., Cheek, supra note 192, at 357, 362n. 26.
511 See 2 Proposals, supra note 3, Parts 3 (but see also at 49, as to which see note
447, supra), 6; lacobucci, supra note 303, at 347; Grover and Baillie, supra note 11,
at 410-23, 444-55. The reason for the Canadian position appears to be a concern to
provide a self-contained scheme of regulation: see references in note 515, infra. The
exemption for intraprovincial transactions is a different matter: see 2 Proposals, op. cit.,
at 92.
512 See Cheek, supra note 192, at 362n. 26.
513 See text accompanying notes 274-77, supra.
514 See Bucklely, supra note 18, at 364; but see Cheek, supra note 192, at 364.
515The philosophy behind the Proposals' Draft Act seems to be to provide a
self-contained scheme of regulation: see Grover and Baillie. supra note 11, at 422 and 2
Proposals, supra note 3 at 334-35.
z51See Part VIIC of the text, infra.
,17 See Simmonds, supra note 19, at 649.
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remaining utility of the new issue scheme of regulation. 518 While the regulators have concluded that scheme continues to have a role even for issuers
well seasoned in the upgraded continuous disclosure scheme, at the very least
a wider set of prospectus exemptions for them seems appropriate.r19 In
addition there appears to be a growing acceptance of variations in the level
of disclosure required in the mandated disclosure documents in new issues
in recognition of any pre-existing store of continuous disclosure on file."20
Difficult questions of degree are involved because continuous disclosure
schemes can vary from simple filing of discrete periodic, timely and special
event disclosure documents, with their integration to be performed by those
inspecting the file, through to filing and file maintenance requirements which
ensure that, at least periodically, an integrated disclosure document as close
as practicable in coverage and currency to the full new issue prospectus is on
file.5- 1 Furthermore, questions arise of the adequacy of the dissemination of
the data and "following" of the issuer whose answers will affect the extent
to which the continuous disclosure file is a substitute for all or any part of
the new issue regulation scheme and its "delivered to investors" disclosure.,r 2
In view of the comparative newness of upgraded continuous disclosure one
would expect much of the integration of the two disclosure schemes to be
left to regulation by the administrative agency in the area. 23 The existing
and proposed integration arrangements are evaluated below.
B.

Present Legislation: the 1978 Ontario Act
Under the 1978 Ontario Act the continuous disclosure regulatory scheme
consists of:
(1) requiring the making up and filing, and in some cases delivery to equity
holders, of 24annual and quarterly financial reports as prescribed by
regulation;
(2) press releases providing timely disclosure of all material changes, subject to a right to keep unduly detrimental information and information
consisting of certain recommendations
of senior management confiden525
tial under OSC oversight;
(3) any mandatory management proxy information circulars as prescribed
by regulation which are otherwise required in the Act-or in their ab.5 18 See text following note 81, supra.
519 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 409.
520 Id.; 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §505(a) and §505(a), Comment (1).
521 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 428-29.
522 See Grover and Baillie, id. at 459-63.
523 See the text accompanying note 306, supra. For a partially dissenting view,
see Bialkin, supra note 283 at 333 (undesirable unless clear legislative guidelines, as to
which see note 641 and accompanying text, infra). It is appropriate, at least if procedures like those discussed in the text following note 637, infra were adopted, to drop
any requirement for the involvement of the Governor-in-Council; see Grover and
Baillie, id. at 401n. 205.
524 The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, ss. 77, 76 and 78 (delivery), as am.
by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 11.
5.25d., s. 74, illuminatingly discussed in detail in Baillie (1980), supra note 15, at
3-14.
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sence an annual report in the prescribed form; 526 and
(4) insider trading reports as prescribed by regulation. 52 7
This scheme represents an upgrading of its predecessor principally by requiring more frequent financial reporting and by elevating from policy statement to a statutory requirement the OSC's and Toronto Stock Exchange's
timely disclosure policies. 528 There is, however, no provision for narrative
disclosure typical of a prospectus except to the extent that this appears in the
proxy information circular or in its absence in the prescribed annual report. 529 There is no provision for integration of filed documents. The OSC
appears to rely, at least with respect to non-shareholders,
on public access
530
to the files for dissemination of filed data.
Subjection to the continuous disclosure scheme under the 1978 Ontario
Act makes an issuer a "reporting issuer" and follows from:
(1) having filed and obtained a receipt for a prospectus, or filed a securities
exchange take-over bid circular, where such filing was made in respect
of an issue of voting securities under a predecessor to the 1978 Act
on or after 1 May 1967531 or was made
under the 1978 Act, regardless
82
of the type of securities involved;3
(2) having any securities listed and posted for trading of a "recognized"
stock exchange
in Ontario at any time since the 1978 Act came into
33
force;
(3) being incorporated under Ontario's Business Corporations Act and a
public offering corporation for the purposes of that Act; 534 or
(4) being a company that is the result or remnant of a statutory combination involving a company that had been a reporting issuer for at least
twelve months, 35
This may be contrasted with the attainment of the equivalent status under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: a listing on a national stock exchange

or at least one million dollars of assets and five hundred shareholders. 3 6 By
526
527

Id., The Securities Act, 1978, s. 80.
Id., ss. 102-105.

528 Simmonds, supra note 19, at 636-37 and 637n. 31.
520

See on the proxy information circular, 0. Reg. 478/79, s. 157 and Form 30.

OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 2.09; Connelly, Securities Regulation and Freedom of Information (Toronto: Commission on Freedom of Information
530

and Individual Privacy, 1979) [hereinafter Connelly, (1979)] at 10-11, 31-37.
531

The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 1(1)38i.

532 Id.,

s. 1(1)38ii: for the considerations underlying the "voting securities" limitation for the pre-1978 Act filings, see OSC Disclosure Report, supra note 9, para. 2.36.
See also the elective filing procedure in s. 52(2).
533 id., s. 1(1)38iii; the recognition procedure is in s. 22(1).
0341d., s. 1(1)38iv" the criteria for public offering corporation status are in The
Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 1(9) as re-enacted by S.O. 1971,
Vol. 2, c. 26, s. 2 and by S.O. 1972, c. 138, s. 1 and as am. by S.O. 1978, c. 49, s. 1(6),

(7).

5 35

ld., s. 1(1)38v.
536 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §12, 15 U.S.C. §781 (1976).
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ensuring that reporting issuers are "followed" by the financial community,
to commend it, a view embodied
the present American standard has 53much
7
in the federal Proposals' Draft Act.
There are only two major prospectus exceptions and one major prospectus exemption in the 1978 Act specially tailored to securities of reporting
issuers. 538 They are to the extension of "distribution" which will come into
effect after the transitional period ends (one also does double duty as an
exemption to the control person extension of "distribution" 53 9). They require
that the issuer at the date of resale must have been a reporting issuer for a
period ranging from six months to eighteen months and not to be in default.540 The first, the resale rule applicable to isolated trades, private
placements and limited offerings purchasers, also imposes holding periods,
reporting obligations and limitations on market grooming and extraordinary
commissions. 54 ' The second, applicable to almost all of the transactional
exemptions not covered by the first rule, imposes no holding period requirement but does require reporting and has a limitation on market grooming
and extraordinary commissions.5 42 The third provides an exemption to the
extension of "distribution" to control person trades as well as the "distribution" extension for a resale by a person to whom a control person gave his
stock as security pursuant to the exemption in that behalf.5 43 There are
reporting requirements and a prohibition on market grooming and extraordinary commissions conditions in the exemption, but no holding period
requirement.5 44 The important point to note is that reporting issuers, even
7

5 Text accompanying
538 The Securities Act,

notes 228-42 and text of note 242, supra.
1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 71(4) (a)-(c) and concluding proviso; s. 71(5) (a)-(c); s. 71(7) (b) and (c) as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 9(2). The first two
subsections are the "exceptions"; they are so called because they strictly describe situations where there is no "distribution" at all; the third subsection is an exemption
because it represents a "distribution," although an exempt one.
539 Id., s. 71(7) (b) and (c) as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 9(2). For the reason for
this see the reference in note 543, infra.
540 Id., ss. 71(4)(a), 71(5)(a), 71(7)(b) opening words; and see s. 71 (8)-(11).
541 Id., ss. 71(4) (b), 71 (3), 71(4) (c), 71 (4) concluding proviso.
542
1d., s. 71(5)(b) and (c). For the probable reasons why no holding period
requirement is imposed, see Johnston, supra note 52, at 232 (less likely to encounter
two step distributions, as to which see text accompanying notes 134 and 146 and 147,
supra; and more likely to encounter here "stable well established companies"), which
is a more satisfying account than that in Alboini, supra note 14, at 497.
543
Id., s. 71(7), opening words. For reasons, see Alboini, id. at 453, 509.
344 Id., s. 71(7)(b) and (c), as am. by S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 9(2). The absence of a
holding period requirement for a resale by a control person is presumably because of the
need to comply with the s. 71 (4) (a)-(c) and concluding proviso resale rules in addition
to the s. 71(7) (b) and (c) ones if the security being resold was acquired pursuant to one
of the s. 71(4) exemptions: see Emerson (1979), supra note 92, at 247. But see Boast,
"Market Dispositions by Controlling Persons and Processing Applications before the
Commission," in [1980] Recent Securities and Corporate Law Developments (Toronto:
Canadian Bar Association, 1980) at I 130 (possibility of amendment to Act to introduce
holding period) and O.S.C.W.S., 27 June 1980 at 3A (same). The absence of a holding
period requirement for a resale by pledges from a control person is presumably because
of the bona fide debt requirement: see Emerson (1979), op. cit., at 244n. 127; but see
also 1 Loss, supra note 3 1, at 645-50.
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those who have been such for only a short time, must obtain permission to
"leak" those securities outside the circle of exemptions. The resulting liquidity
restrictions for purchasers of securities of nonreporting issuers should supply
a considerable incentive to attain reporting issuer status.5 45
That measure of integration was inspired by the American example in
the rule under the Securities Act of 1933 constraining resales of securities

acquired under the non-public offering exemption. 546 Beyond that, however,
there are no further integrative provisions in the Act. In particular, there are
no express regulations setting the permissible forms of prospectus for a
reduction of the level of disclosure for reporting issuers similar to those
developed under the Securities Act of 1933.547 Until recently, the statutory
standard for prospectuses, that they provide full, true and plain disclosure of
all material facts, denied any power to introduce differential disclosure of
that type.548 A recent set of amendments to the Act now appears to permit
differential disclosure standards. 49 In light of the form of continuous disclosure and the breadth of its application being triggered simply by a prospectus
filing, such tentativeness is justified.
C.

Proposed Legislation: the Draft Act
Integration will be considerably advanced under the Draft Act, which
draws heavily on the ALI Code in this area. The continuous disclosure
scheme in the Draft Act, applicable to a "reporting issuer," 550 consists primarily of filing an initial "registration statement" prescribed by the CSC on
entry into the system. 551 The "registration statement" is a document inspired
by, but travelling some distance from, the initial registration document under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the ALI Code. 552 This document

545

Text following note 194, supra.

546 See text accompanying notes 189-92 and the reference in note 188, supra.

For those rules, see Painter, supra note 9, at 4n. 11.
See The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 55(1) and Grover and Baillie,
supra note 11, at 401.
549 See The Securities Amendment Act, 1979, S.O. 1979, c. 86, s. 7, in force Jan. 1,
1980, substituting a new s. 62 for The Securities Act, 1978, id., s. 62. To the time of
writing, there has been no implementation of the material part of this section (ss. (I)).
550 Defined in 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.38, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra
note 3, at 30.
551 1 Proposals, id., s. 4.02, discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 65-67.
552 Compare 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 68-69 (registration statement, to be
periodically updated, may contain data, especially "soft" data to be omitted from "less
detailed and technical" report required to be sent to investors under continuous disclosure part of Act) with I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §602(b) (SEC by "rule"
may require the annual report [sent to the classes of security holders prescribed by
rule: § 602(a)(2)] "to integrate and replace the registration statement" [emphasis
added]) and Bialkin, supra note 283, at 334-35. The Draft Act has the filed, but not
delivered, periodically updated registration statement, intended for investment analysts
and sophisticated investors, as its "basic" disclosure document: see 2 Proposals, op. cit.,
at 259 (dealing with special liability rule for this document only) and see also 2
Proposals,op. cit., at 113 (annual report and proxy circular should "together form the
foundation for disclosure to investors") and at 264 (but are "not as basic to the disclosure system as the registration statement"). The ALl Code by contrast has the filed
547
548
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must be amended annually55 3 so that the information contained therein is
brought up to the end of the issuer's most recent financial year, a provision
apparently inspired by the ALI Code.5 54 Interim disclosure is by means of:
(1) preparation, filing and delivery of quarterly 555 and annual reports (not
necessarily confined to financial data);5G

(2) preparation, filing and issuing of press releases containing timely disclosure of non-public material facts learnt by the issuer, subject to an
ability under CSC oversight to keep the fact confidential if disclosure
557
would be unduly prejudicial;
(3) preparation, filing and delivery of proxy information circulars;658 and
(4) preparation and filing of insider reports.55 0
There is a separate provision in the Draft Act that permits the CSC by regulation to require the initiation of dissemination of filed documents. 00 This is
not quite the same mandate as the one given to the SEC under the ALI
Code, however. The SEC can require a "registrant," the ALI Code equivalent
to a "reporting issuer," to prepare, file and publish whatever reports the SEC
requires "to keep reasonably current the information and documents contained in the registration statement or to keep investors reasonably informed
with respect to the registrant." 561 There is a separate provision for only one
other type of continuous disclosure document: proxy information circulars.5 6 2 "Reporting issuer" status under the Draft Act, as has already been
described, follows from having a class of securities listed on a "registered
securities exchange" or three hundred or more "public security holders" and
filing a registration statement. This follows the pattern of the Securities Ex-

and delivered annual report, intended for a wider audience, rather than the once-andfor-all registration statement, as its "central device for continuous disclosure": see I
ALI Fed. Sec. Code, op. cit., §602(a)-(d), Comment (2); and see 2 ALI Fed. Sec.
Code, supra note 6, §1704(a) (the progenitor of special liability rule in Draft Act for
registration statement applies under Code to its registration statement and its annual
reports, inter alia). With respect to some of the criticisms of mandated disclosure
referred to early in this article, there is much to commend the Draft Act position: see,
e.g., reference in 2 Proposals,op. cit., at 69n. 53.
553 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 4.04(1).
554 See I ALI Fed. Sec. Code, §602(b) referred to in note 552, supra.
,55 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 7.02, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
109-11.
556 1 Proposals,id., s. 7.01, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. It is noted that the CSC will
move toward integrating disclosure in the "registration statement" and the disclosure
documents required under Part 7, including but not limited to the annual report, to the
extent feasible: 2 Proposals,op. cit., at 109, 68-69.
557 1 Proposals,id., s. 7.03, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 111-12.
558 1Proposals,id., s. 7.06, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 113.
559 1 Proposals,id., ss. 7.12-7.18, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 116-17, 118-21.
,60 1 Proposals,id., s. 16.07(c), discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 393; and see Grover
and Baillie, supra note 11, at 381, 387-88, 457-58, 464.
,61 1 AL! Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §602(a).
562 Id., §603(c); and see on the relative importance of the proxy circular in I ALl
Fed. Sec. Code, id., §602(a)-(d), Comment (2)(a).
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change Act of 1934-but unlike the 1978 Ontario Act or the ALI Code,

with their common
trigger of distribution issue qualificationM6 -for very
4
reasons.
sound
The Draft Act contains an exception to the definition of "distribution"
and a prospectus exemption that are only available to reporting issuers. In
addition there is at least one prospectus exemption with terms that vary with
reporting issuer status. All three are inspired by the present American scheme
and the ALI Code. The exception to the definition of "distribution" is the
ability to make post-holding period non-exempt trades which would otherwise be distributions for persons who acquired securities from an issuer or an
underwriter. 6 5 The holding period, included to prevent "two step distributions," may be varied by the CSC.566 For example, the Commentary calls
for lengthening the period when the issuer has not been a reporting issuer
long enough to see its continuous disclosure disseminated and to have developed a sufficient following. 56 7 Conspicuously absent is any condition that
there be no resale market grooming or extraordinary commission.568 The
theory here appears to be that these are largely directed at disturbance of
market trading patterns which, to the extent it is not prevented by the holding period requirement, will in part be handled as a distinct disclosure problem under the block distribution extension of "distribution," with its "block
distribution circular." 56 9 It may also be that sufficient protection is seen to
flow from continuous disclosure in situations outside the area covered by that
extension. 570 This also appears to be the position, at least for securities of
one-year registrants, under the ALI Code's only provision imposing a holding period for resale: the limited offering exemption. 571 It is not at all clear
that any such faith is well placed at this point in the evolution of continuous
disclosure.5 72 It is arguable that at least a power by regulation to impose
absence of market grooming conditions ought to be conferred on the regulatory agency, to be invoked if experience indicates it would be desirable. 573
563

See text accompanying notes 238-42, and of note 238, supra.

564 See text accompanying notes 241, 242, supra.

565 See 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 2.17(b), discussed in the text following note
227, supra.

)66 1 Proposals,id., s. 2.17(b) (concluding words).
567

2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 18.

Compare the positions under the Ontario and present American legislation: see
text accompanying notes 181 and 192, supra; and see Grover and Baillie, supra note 11,
at 450 ("tentatively recommended" market grooming prohibition; "should be the subject of continuing review").
569 On the requirement for a "block distribution circular," see 1 Proposals, supra
note 3, s. 2.17(d), discussed in the text accompanying notes 246 et seq., supra.
570 But see Grover and Baillie, vsupra note 11, at 450.
568

571

See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41)(B), discussed in the text

following note 258, supra. The power to vary the terms of the exemption as regards
securities of non-one-year registrants in §202(4)(b)(iii) apparently permits imposition
of an absence of market grooming condition.
572 Cf. Grover and Baiflie, supra note 11, at 450.
573 Any such power should, however, be subject to the controls discussed in the text
following note 637, infra.
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The Draft Act's prospectus exemption that
focuses 574 on reporting issuer
575 inspired by the ALI Code, 570
status is the "trading transaction" exemption,
but in one respect broader and in another narrower than the parent provision. The Draft Act exemption covers a distribution where the issuer has
been registered at least one year and is not in default; no selling or promotional expenses can be incurred except for services customarily performed
by a registrant in connection with a trade in a market. Sales on behalf of the
issuer or selling security holder must not exceed a prescribed dollar amount,
percentage of trading volume or percentage of outstanding securities or any
prescribed combination. 577 The corresponding provision in the ALI Code is
very similar except that it excludes issuers, except as the SEC otherwise
provides by rule, 578 and it includes securities of an issuer who is not a "oneyear registrant," subject to any SEC rule modifying the conditions or imposing additional ones for such issuers. 579 The idea behind the exemption is
similar to that for isolated trades: 580 to facilitate dispositions which can
readily be absorbed by the market, subject to "bright-line" criteria that avoid
the interpretive difficulties of isolation. 581 Viewed in that light, there seems
to be no sufficient reason to withhold the benefit of the exemption from
issuers. 582 That same perspective suggests that any rule absolutely excluding
non-reporting issuers from the exemption may be unreasonable. 83 In fact,
the CSC has the opportunity, after gaining experience with the exemption, to
fashion a trading transaction exemption for non-reporting issuers under its
general power to increase the number of exemptions, 584 just as the SEC under
the power described could extend the exemption to such issuers.
Omitted from the Draft Act is any equivalent to the ALI Code's exemption for resales by secondary distributors of securities of one-year registrants
without limit, provided that the seller does not hold fifteen percent or more
of the issuer's voting securities. 58 5 This raises the question whether the
trading transaction exemption is not too narrow for reporting issuers. In
574 Compare the exclusionary rule for reporting issuers in I Proposals,supra note
3, s. 3.01(e), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at 50.
575 1 Proposals,id., s. 6.04, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 102-103.
576 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41 ) (c).
577 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 6.04 (2)(a)-(c).
578 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41)(c)(i)(1); and see §202(41),
Comment (12).
579
Id., §202(41) (c) (ii); and see §202(41), Comment (6).
580 On the isolated trade type of exemption, see text accompanying notes 158 el
seq., supra.
581 Cf. Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 437 (source of quotation). And see I
Proposals, supra note 3, s. 6.04(3), discussed in 2 Proposals, note 3, at 103 (CSC may
require issuer to file and disseminate information where CSC believes that use of exemption has caused such an increase in trading activities as to warrant this).
582 See, id. at 437; 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §202(41), Comment (12).
583
See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, id., §202(41)(s)(i)(I) (takes in such issuers); but see
§202(41), Comment (12) and Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 437.
584 See I Proposals,supra note 3, s. 3.03; and cf. 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 73.
585 See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §512(4), discussed in text accompanying notes 218-22, supra; but see also 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, §512(4), Comment (5).
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particular one may ask why the importance the Draft Act attached to considering special disclosure delivered to buyers for large block resales of
securities would not be neutralized where the securities are those of an issuer
who has been reporting for at least one year. Moreover, reporting issuer
status under the Draft Act seems better calculated 8 6 than "registrant" status
under the ALI Code to ensure a following for the issuer. The available58 7data
from tests of the efficient capital market hypothesis adds point to this.
The answer is not given in the Draft Act. One can surmise, however,
that there was a concern about the efficacy even of a "following" to handle
the special selling efforts entailed, 58 although one can respond that it is not
clear that special disclosure delivered to investors will do better. 58 9 One can
only hope that experience accumulated under the ALI Code exemption5 90
will be monitored to see if a matching exemption should be created by
regulation under the Draft Act.
Finally, the Draft Act clearly contemplates differential prospectus disclosure for reporting issuers. There is no overarching statutory "full, true and
plain" disclosure requirement for Draft Act prospectuses, their content being
left entirely to regulation-making by the CSC. 59 ' The CSC, in the exercise of
that power, is directed to ensure that reporting issuers' prospectus requirements "are designed to avoid unnecessary repetition of information previously filed by the issuer.15 92 The use of "unnecessary" should ensure that the
CSC takes account of the actual
impact of the continuous disclosure pro593
vided by the reporting issuer.
VII. NATIONAL PUBLIC ISSUES.
A.

Introduction
Against this background it is clear that the Draft Act's distribution
disclosure scheme will be very similar to that of the 1978 Ontario Act.
However, the former will be broader at a number of points, of which the
regulation of block trades 59 4 and the cutting back in a number of exemptions
borrowed from the Ontario Act 95 are prime examples. The Draft Act's
scheme is also narrower at a number of points, as its limited offering598 and
580 See text accompanying notes 241, 242, supra.
587 See references in note 46, supra.
588 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 448.
589 See Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets (1964), 37 J. Bus. 117
and Saari, supra note 39, at 1058n. 136; but see also Williamson (1978), supra note 15,
at 62.
590 See, e.g., the "second thoughts" on the width of 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra
note 6, §512(4) expressed in §512(4), Comment (5).
591 1 Proposals,supra note 3, s. 5.05, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
78-79.
r592 1 Proposals,id., s.5.05(2).
593 See also 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 79, 72.
594 See text accompanying notes 246 et seq., supra.
59 5
See text accompanying notes 419-24, supra.
59
0 See text accompanying notes 258-84, supra.
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trading transactions exemptions exemplify. 597 The Draft Act is also cut back
to exclude purely local distributions. But all of this will still leave a large
area of overlap in regulation between the federal Act and the legislation of
the provinces following the 1978 Ontario model.508 The cool reception so
far accorded the federal initiative of the Draft Act"99 and the concerns surrounding the proposal for an additional layer of disclosure regulationO °
make appropriate background to federal regulation and the accommodation
provisions in the Draft Act.
B.

The Present Legislation in Canada

Provincial securities legislation in the distribution area typically has no
express jurisdictional link with persons or transactions in the enacting province. 600 However, the "in the province" limitation on the legislature's constitutional competence 0 2 has not, so far, proved troublesome in the context
of any distribution beyond the provincial boundaries. The few cases on
record support an expansive interpretation of the permitted ambit of the
provincial law., 03 Given the national character of Canada's financial markets
generally, 60 4 and assuming the absence of any other constitutional impediment,605 this would suggest frequent conjoint application of provincial securities laws. The continuing impulse to harmonize the relevant legislation 0"
goes to ameliorate the difficulties in much of this. Perhaps more importantly,
in view of the importance of administrative discretion in the new issue
area, 0 7 there are arrangements for administrative co-ordination in national
issue qualificationw s which appear to have worked well. However, it is perSee text accompanying notes 574-84, supra.
598 See 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 334, which notes that only some parts of the
Draft Act would likely be found to displace provincial legislation on paramountcy
principles. Part 5-the distribution part-is probably not one of them, as 1 Proposals,
supra note 3, s. 5.10, discussed in 2 Proposals, op. cit., at 85-86 (but note the case of
block distribution circulars: 86) acknowledges. For a recent case on pre-emption of
provincial securities legislation by federal corporations law, see Multiple Access v.
McCutcheon (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 593, 78 D.L.R. (3d) 701 (Div. Ct.), aff'd (1978),
19 O.R. (2d) 516 (C.A.), appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada pending.
597

599 See note 23, supra.

600 Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 420.
601 See Johnston, supra note 52, at 324 (former legislation). See now The Securities

Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47, s. 52 read with s. 1(1)11 ("distribution") and s. 1(1)42
("trade") and Alboini, supra note 14, at 213-16.
02
6 See The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(13); and see
Anisman and Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Regulation" (1978),
in 3 Proposals, supra note 1, [hereinafter Anisman and Hogg] at 147.
603
See Anisman and Hogg, id. at 144-47.
604 See Anisman and Hogg, id. at 139-40, who go on to note the international
character of that market, op. cit., 140-41. See also Hebenton and Gibson, "International Aspects of Securities Regulation" (1978), in 3 Proposals,supra note 1, at 1139
et seq., passim.
605 A matter returned to in the text accompanying notes 612, 613, infra.
60u See Buckley, supranote 18, at 3 1On. 6 and accompanying text.
07 See Grover and Baillie, supra note 11, at 395-96.
608 See National Policy No. 1, set out and discussed in Alboini, supra note 14, at
358-60.
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haps less clear that administrative co-operation in Canada is adequate to the
task of providing uniform official encouragement and guidance for the development of a nation-wide securities trading mechanism that will liberate the
market from the tyranny of paper. 609 The same may also be true of fostering
automated methods of disseminating disclosure documents' contents. 610 Also,
administrative co-operation is not always likely to be forthcoming where the
efficient functioning of a national market might seem to put a premium
upon it.0""
However, there may also be constitutional impediments to the apparently broad application of provincial securities law which would create a
Canadian legislative vacuum. Caselaw discussed in a background paper to
the Proposals suggests this, in relation to transactions with interprovincial
613
612
and those involving federal corporations.
and international elements
The Proposalsconcede that the constitutional basis is not altogether firm for
a complete scheme of federal regulation that would fill any gap, as well as
more unabashedly deal with the national character of securities trading. 614
But there are strong arguments that can be adduced in support of the new
issue and continuous disclosure schemes of regulation, at least in the Draft
Act, that draw much of their strength from the national character of the
Canadian primary and secondary securities markets. 15
C.

Proposed FederalRegulation in Canada
The Draft Act will follow the example of the Securities Act of 1933616
in providing a second layer of securities regulation for all primary market
transactions other than purely local ones. For constitutional reasons, the
Draft Act 17 does not attempt the pre-emption in the non-local "distribution"
area which is to be found in the ALl Code, 18 the result of an agreement
with the state securities regulators in the United States. 61 9 The degree of
duplication in the Draft Act is, if anything, greater than in the present
American arrangements. Under them, disclosure is the federal regulatory
technique while state schemes feature both disclosure and "blue sky" or merit

G09 Cf. Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 126-30 (noting that non-goverment
initiations have so far been very successful, however).
010 Cf. Anisman and Hogg, supra note 602, at 140, 142.
611 See, id. at 142.
012 Id. at 147-50.
013 Id. at 150-52.
614 Id. at 190-97 (civil remedies); and see now Rocois Construction v. Quebec
Ready Mix, [1980] 1 F.C. 184, and Labatt Breweries of Can. Ltd. v. A.G. Can. (1979),
30 N.R. 496 (S.C.C.).
015 See Anisman and Hogg, supra note 602, at 156-76 (based on trade and commerce power and works or undertakings power).

See 1 Loss, supra note 31, at 157-58.
See 2 Proposals,supranote 3, at 384.
618 See 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1904(a), (b) and (d).
019 See, id., §1904, Comment (2), described as "almost a minor miracle" by the
Reporter for the Code project in Loss (1979), supra note 221, at 1448.
010

017
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control.120 The Draft Act, by contrast, will follow the 1978 Ontario Act and
the other provincial legislation in expressly reposing "blue sky" discretion in
the CSC.6 1
However, given the rationale of the Canadian federal scheme as well as
its constitutional underpinnings, it is clear that the focus of that scheme will
be on national issues. This is acknowledged in the distribution regulation
area by the local distribution exemption. That exemption covers a distribution, "where all of the sales are made in the same province. 0 22 The exemption is wider than the corresponding provision in the Securities Act of 1933,
which requires that the issue be confined in offer and sale to persons "resident within a single state or territory" and that the issuer of a corporation be
"incorporated and doing business within ... such state or territory."''

23

The

Draft Act exemption is both wider and narrower than the corresponding ALI
Code provision, which requires that the distribution be one that,
results in sales substantially restricted to persons who are residents of or have
their primary employment in a
State and a contiguous foreign
[and] involves securities of an
place of business in that State

single State, or an area in contiguous States (or a
country) as that area is defined by rule or orders
issuer that has or proposes to have itsprincipal
0 24
or area, regardless of where it is organized.

One may question the excision of the "doing business" criterion from the
Draft Act exemption, which will leave it to the provinces to extract and test

the quality of disclosure of material facts having their locus outside the

province.(325 The restriction of the Draft Act exemption to single provinces
will do less harm in a country of large provinces than the corresponding
provision in the American Act which led to the trans-state extension in the
Code.' Should a corresponding problem arise in Canada, 62 7 it is contemplated that the Draft Act's power to create exemptions by regulation will be
28
used."
'2 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1904, Comment (6). This is not to deny
that disclosure control by the SEC has been administered with some "blue sky" objectives: cf. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Securities Regulation: A Brief Review
(1974), 25 Hastings L.J. 311 at 333.

';2i 1 Proposals,.supra note 3, s. 5.09(2)-(4), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note
3,at 82-85.
I Proposals,id., s. 6.05, discussed in 2 Proposals,id. at 104-106.
6 :3Securities Act of 1933, §3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. §77c(I)
(1976); and see
622
2

I Loss, supra note 31, at 591-605, esp. at 598-600, 601; and IV Loss, supra note 137,
at 2600-606, esp. at 2603-604.
'4 1 AL! Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §514(c) read with §514(a)(1)

and (2);

and see §1904, Comment (3). For a critical review of the exemption see Wolfson
(1979), supra note 194, at 1506-508.

625 However, it isnot clear that this is the rationale of the condition in the present
American exemption: cf. I Loss, supra note 31, at 601n. 158 and text accompanying that

note; IV Loss, supra note 137, at 2604. But note the change in wording in I ALl Fed.
Sec. Code, supra note 6, §514(a)(2).
;2 See Cheek, supra note 192, at 380.
127The prime examples seem to be Ottawa-Hull and Windsor (Ontario)-Detroit.
The latter example, from a different geographical perspective, occurred to the drafters

of the Code: I ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, § 1904, Comment (3)(g)(ii).
'28 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 105.
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Where overlap between the federal and the provincial schemes does
exist, and in view of the substantial correspondence between them in regulatory approach which is missing in the United States, there are a number of
useful accommodation provisions in the Draft Act not to be found in the
present American federal scheme or (with one exception) the ALI Code.629
The CSC must issue a receipt for a prospectus for which a receipt has been
issued by a provincial securities commission. 63 0 However, under the same
provision the CSC may by order confine the distribution to that province,
a qualifier which seems likely to encourage co-operation between federal and
provincial administrative authorities. For its part, the CSC in another provision somewhat similar to one in the ALI Code63" 1 is directed to be cooperative with the provincial authorities "in order to minimize duplication
of effort and maximize the protection afforded investors in Canada."' 32
Finally, institutionalized co-operation is provided for in a pair of sections
in the Draft Act that permit: delegation of any or all CSC powers, duties,
633
functions or responsibilities to existing provincial bodies or a new body;
the CSC to exercise of all or any powers or to perform all or any duties,
functions or responsibilities of a provincial
authority; 34 and a provincial
63 5
CSC.
securities commissioner to join the
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article has sought to provide the origins and elaboration of the
distinctive feature of recent securities reform in Canada in the distribution
area, present and proposed. That feature is the introduction of a distribution
disclosure document requirement that omits the element of "public" participation, with all its uncertainties, while addressing itself to the problem of
resale of securities acquired without such documentation through an exemption. The Canadian reformers have also addressed themselves to the questions of whether and how to regulate other resales which also appear to merit
a distribution disclosure document requirement. The resultant closed systems,
under Ontario's Securities Act, 1978 and the Draft Act put forward by the
federal Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law for Canada, as well as their

American inspirations, are dauntingly complex. However, the Canadian
systems are far more amenable to certainty of application than the schemes
typified by the 1966 Ontario Act.
The 1978 Ontario Act and the Draft Act's systems, however, are not
beyond criticism. It was found that the more recent Draft Act and its excel-029See for the latter the provisions of 1 ALI Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, § 1904

(a), (b) and (i).

630 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 5.10, discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
85-86. Block distribution circulars are excluded for the reasons given in 2 Proposals,
op. cit., at 86.
6311 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, supra note 6, §1904(i).
632 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 15.12(1), discussed in 2 Proposals, supra note 3, at
344.
63.31 Proposals, id., s. 15.06(1)(a), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 334-35.
034 1 Proposals, id., s. 15.06(1) (b), discussed in 2 Proposals, id.
635 1 Proposals, id., s. 15.07, discussed in 2 Proposals, id.
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lent published Commentary and Background Papers as well as the ALI
Code provisions on which the Draft Act so extensively draws, were fertile
sources of criticism of the 1978 Ontario Act. At a number of points it is not
at all clear that the Draft Act has produced better solutions.
Perhaps the Draft Act has the most to offer in the area of the exemptions.
A much better job than the 1978 Ontario Act appears to have been done in
elaborating the occasions when the distribution document should not be required and what residual protections are left in place. Nowhere was this better
illustrated than in the exemptions of value to smaller issuers. In addition, the
Draft Act has some very useful proposals to offer, elaborating the degree of
integration between its distribution disclosure and its continuous disclosure
schemes.
Throughout this discussion, the theme of administrative power to make
adjustments in the distribution disclosure trigger, in the exemptions and the
contents of required disclosure, was sounded. Such power seems desirable
in a field as specialized and subject to rapid change in context as securities
regulation. Further evidence of the utility of such power is given by the
circumstances of its use in the Draft Act.
However, as the discussion of the disclosure philosophy in securities
regulation at the beginning of this article made clear, there is much more
to be learned about the costs and the benefits of the distribution disclosure
schemes. In the exercise of its powers, there is a need for the securities
regulatory agency to be kept informed of the work being done in that area
and its implications for the law.6 30 The Draft Act has some particularly
important contributions to make in this area too. Not only are there to be
found among its background papers a particularly thought-provoking pair on
the role of disclosure, 37 but the Draft Act itself appears to give statutory
encouragement to the kind of receptiveness here commended. The Act can
be seen doing this in the procedure it mandates for regulations. That procedure, drawing heavily on American experience, entails publication of all
proposed regulations, provision of an opportunity to "interested persons" to
make representations, power in the OSC to convene a hearing and a requirement to publish with the final regulation a statement of its purpose. 3 8 As
well, there is provision for any person to petition the CSC to make, amend
636.Accord, Williamson (1978), supra note 15, at 83; Wolfson (1979), supra note
194, at 1501-502. For somewhat more prosaic matters that could usefully be put on the
research agenda, see Wolfson (1979), op. cit., at 1502-506 (on the ground covered by
the ALI Code's limited offering exemption), 1506-508 (on that covered by the Code's
local distribution exemption) and 1508-15 (on that covered by the Code's handling of
secondary distributions).
637 Williamson (1978), id.; Grover and Baillie, supra note 11.
638 1 Proposals, supra note 3, s. 15.15(l)-(4); but see the dispensing power in s.
15.15(5). The section is discussed in 2 Proposals,supra note 3, at 352-58, which relates
it to American and Canadian experience. However, without positive encouragement to
intervene-including financial support-it is not clear that as comprehensive a sampling
of opinion as is desirable will be achieved: see Taylor, Comments on The Mandate and
Operation of the Ontario Securities Commission (1978), 36 Fac. L. Rev. U. of T. I at
34-39.
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or repeal a regulation.6 39 All of this is against the background of (limited)
judicial review of regulations6 40 and a lengthy statement of the purposes of
the Draft Act, headed by "the efficient functioning of the capital market"
and "the securities maret should provide an effective means for the allocabeyond
tion of capital to the most efficient users."' 641 This goes significantly
6 42
what is now provided in the Ontario scheme of regulation.
None of these institutional arrangements in the Draft Act will ensure
6 43
that the regulators ask the "right" questions about their regulatory scheme.
But in a welter of change in an economically significant area of law, it helps
set a good statutory forum.

639 1 Proposals, id., s. 15.15(6), discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 358.
640 1 Proposals, id., s. 15.20, discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 372-77.
641 1 Proposals, id., s. 1.02(a), (b). The section is discussed in 2 Proposals, id. at 1-5.
This listing here is rather more elaborate than that in the preamble to the Securities Act
of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) or the provisions of 1 ALl Fed. Sec.
Code, supra note 6, §§101 and 102, as to which 1 ALl Fed. Sec. Code, Part I, Introductory Comment. For the importance of elaboration of legislative policy in the context of
broad delegated legislative power, see Garrett and Weaver, supra note 60, at 461-62.
The reservation expressed in Taylor, supra no:e 638, at 40 (may prematurely freeze
debate over proper goals) seems to this author to be adequately addressed in 2 Proposals,
op. cit., at 372-77, and its supporting material. Less easy to counter, however, is the
concern in Taylor, op. cit., at 28 that an administrative agency subject to these types
of controls might be driven to prefer policy statement over regulation. However, recent
OSC activity (see following note and note 395, supra) is somewhat heartening in this
regard. For a suggested counter to this concern, see Taylor, op. cit., at 28-29.
642 On regulation-making procedure in Ontario, see The Regulations Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 410. There are no statutory provisions in Ontario confirming a person's ability
to petition to make a regulation. Judicial review of regulations is a common law
matter: 2 Proposals, id. at 375-76; Reid and David, Administrative Law and Practice
(2d ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) at 274 et seq. Also, there is no recital of the
purposes or background to regulation in The Securities Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 47.
It is readily admitted, however, that in regulation-making procedure the OSC (the body
with which virtually all of them originate: see Connelly (1979), supra note 530, at 28)
as a matter of practice does take care to invite the opinion of interested parties with
respect to proposed regulations: see, e.g., O.S.C.W.S., week ending 14 December 1979,
Supp. "X-2" (on what later became, as amended, 0. Reg. 190/80, in force 7 April 1980).
643 Cf. Wolfson, The Need for Empirical Research in Securities Law (1976), 49
S. Cal. L. Rev. 286 at 286-90; Taylor, supra note 638, at 8, 37 (importance of who
are chosen to be the regulators).

